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Abstract 
 
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), credit booms have been associated with financial 
instability and crisis for as long as 800 years. Notwithstanding, the debate on the sustainability of 
increased indebtedness in the world economy has regained importance, as trends for both public and 
private debt show rapid rises in the last three decades. To understand the effect of debt accumulation 
on growth, there is a need to look comprehensively at all forms of non-financial debt – household, 
corporate and government debt. Using panel data on 20 advanced economies between the years 
1980-2014, this essay investigates the relationship between public (government) and private 
(household and corporate) debt growth and economic growth. This is done through a dynamic panel 
data model that is estimated using both a system GMM estimator and a bias corrected OLS 
estimator. Both short- and long-term effects are considered in the model. Potential non-linear effects 
are studied as well. In addition to GDP growth, the effect of debt on capital growth, TFP growth 
and private consumption growth is modeled in an effort to examine potential channels through 
which debt is likely to affect growth. The results show that there is a relationship between both 
public and private debt and growth. However, the relationship differs in the short- and long-term 
and is more complex for private debt. The main finding is that public debt growth seems to pose a 
larger problem for economic growth in the short-term, while there should be a greater concern 
regarding household debt growth in the longer run. Furthermore, this thesis finds nonlinear 
relationships between growth of public and private debt and GDP growth, both in the short-term 
and long-term analysis. Hence, reductions of debt are associated with higher GDP growth, while 
debt accumulation is associated with lower GDP growth. However, the results are only significant on 
the short-term basis. The negative effect on GDP growth from both public and private debt 
primarily operates through lower capital and TFP growth. In regards to private consumption, some 
evidence is provided to the notion that both public and private debt growth crowds out private 
investments, reducing capital accumulation and long run growth.  
 
Keywords: Public debt, private debt, corporate debt, household debt, credit booms, economic growth, 
capital stock, TFP, household consumption, financial crisis  
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 1 
1 Introduction 
 
Credit booms have been associated with financial instability and financial crises for as long as 800 
years according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Historically, only a minority of these booms have 
ended in crashes. However, some of these crashes have been significant, contributing to the belief 
that credit booms are at worst a recipe for disaster and at best dangerous (IMF, 2012). Despite this, 
the global financial crisis in 2007, preceded by a private credit boom, marked the beginning of an 
intense policy debate on the need to monitor the role of indebtedness in the world economy 
(Schularick and Taylor, 2012). The main reason is the rapid increase of private and public borrowing 
in many advanced countries, raising questions of the long-term sustainability of credit expansions. 
There is also a growing recognition that the interplay between public and private debt carries weight 
for macroeconomic outcomes and financial stability (Reinhart et al., 2012). Hence, there is a need to 
look comprehensively at all forms of non-financial debt – household, corporate and government 
debt – to understand its effect on growth (Cecchetti et al., 2011).  
 
Average total debt for advanced economies, including both public and private debt, has increased 
substantially from 130 percent of GDP in the 1980s to approximately 270 percent of GDP in 2014 
(BIS, 2015). Financial liberalization and higher private sector debt are the main drivers behind this 
increasing trend (Taylor, 2012). Debt accumulation can affect economic growth in either a positive 
or a negative direction. A positive effect may arise as debt facilitates consumption smoothing and 
investments, in turn raising capital and technology (Cecchetti et al., 2011). This effect is more likely 
on the short-term as debt boosts aggregate demand. On the longer run however, debt can affect 
growth negatively by crowding out private investments, inducing financial instability and crisis as well 
as draining productive sectors of the economy of workers as the financial sector grows (Elmendorf 
and Mankiw, 1999; Rajan, 2005; and Kneer, 2013). The way in which debt affects growth should also 
depend on whether lending feeds speculative bubbles or finance investment in productive assets 
(Arcand et. al., 2015). 
 
There is a broad collection of empirical research examining the relationship between debt and 
economic growth. Appendix 1 includes a list of selected papers, covering descriptions of studies, 
samples, methods and main findings. Previous research findings show an impact from debt on 
growth, but the relationship appears complex. Focus is largely put on nonlinear relationships and 
threshold estimations, where the majority of studies find a positive effect on growth from low levels 
of debt, while high1 levels of debt is associated with lower growth (see e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2010; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012; Arcand et al., 2015). Arguably the most influential and 
controversial contribution is the one put forward by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), showing that public 
debt/GDP levels above 90 percent are associated with significantly lower growth. However, in a 
famous replication and critique, Herndon et al. (2013) concludes that debt does not dramatically 
                                                 
1 The definition of high debt levels differs but the conventional view from previous research is that debt/GDP 
ratios above 80-100 percent starts to become harmful for the economy (see e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; 
Cecchetti et. al., 2011; and Reinhart et. al., 2012).  
 2 
lower growth when correcting for coding errors. Along the same lines, several studies find no 
evidence of systematic nonlinearities (see e.g. Eberhart and Presbiter, 2015). Instead, as pointed out 
by Pescatori et al. (2014), the debt trajectory is important, as countries with high but declining debt 
seem to grow at an equally fast rate as countries with lower debt. There is also the question of 
causality when studying debt and growth, as most studies highlight the issue of endogeneity (Easterly, 
2001; Panizza and Presbitero, 2014; and Reinhart et al., 2012). Easterly (2001) claims that the 
causality runs from slow growth to high debt, while Panizza and Presbitero (2014) find no causal 
relationship between public debt and growth.  
 
Up until recently the literature has mainly focused on public debt2 (see e.g. Égert, 2015; and Pescatori 
et al., 2014), while fewer have included private sector debt3 (see e.g. Cecchetti et al., 2011). In 
research made, private debt is found to have a drag on growth above threshold levels of 80-100 
percent of GDP (Arcand et al., 2015), similar to threshold levels found for public debt. 
Incorporating private (household and corporate) and public (government) debt is important in terms 
of policy insight, especially when analyzing debt dynamics around episodes of financial stress and 
crisis. Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, private sector debt rose fast in advanced countries, while 
there was a quick expansion of public debt in arrears (Dembiermont et al., 2015; Reinhart et al., 2012 
and 2015). In addition, private sector credit booms are regarded good predictors of financial crises 
and should therefore be included in the analysis (Taylor, 2012; and Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). 
Finally, a number of studies focus on the channels through which debt influences growth, where the 
negative relationship between debt and growth seems to originate from reduced investments, 
affecting both the capital stock and TFP negatively (Kumar and Woo, 2010; Pattillo et al., 2004; and 
Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012).  
 
This essay attempts to provide additional evidence of the relationship between debt, both public and 
private, and economic growth by giving insights to the following questions: (i) if there is an impact 
from government, household and corporate debt on economic growth; (ii) if the impact differs on 
the short-term and long-term; (iii) if the impact is nonlinear4; as well as (iv) if the channels through 
which the impact is likely to occur are capital stock, TFP5, and private consumption. The main 
contribution of this study is the extent of the analysis by including both public (government) and 
private (household and corporate) debt. In addition, research connecting both sectors and potential 
growth channels in terms of capital stock, TFP and private consumption has not been found. Both 
public and private debt should affect growth through the channels of capital and TFP as debt can 
                                                 
2 Public debt is debt accumulated by central (federal) governments, state governments and municipalities. It 
can take different forms such as government bonds and sovereign debt (governments borrowing from each 
other) (Bloch and Fall, 2015; and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011).  
3 Private debt is the debt accumulated by individuals and corporations and can take many forms such as 
personal loans, bank loans, credit card debt, corporate bonds and business loans (Dembiermont et. al., 2013; 
and Meakin, 2015). 
4 Where a concave (inverted U-shape) relationship is expected according to previous research (see Checherita-
Westphal and Rother, 2012).  
5 Total factor productivity (TFP) is a measure of labor productivity and how productively the economy uses 
all factors of production (Aghion and Howitt, 2009:106). 
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boost consumption and investments in the shorter run (raising capital and technology), but crowd 
out private savings and investments in the log-run through higher private consumption (Kumar and 
Woo, 2010, and Pattillo et al., 2004). Hence, by including both a short-term and long-term analysis, it 
is possible to capture the dynamics of the growth-debt nexus. 
 
In order to estimate the causal relationship between debt and growth, this thesis uses an empirical 
approach. The examination includes a panel of 20 advanced economies between the years 1980-
2014. The estimation method is based on a dynamic panel data model that is estimated using both a 
system GMM estimator and a bias corrected OLS estimator. In addition to GDP growth, the effect 
of debt on capital growth, TFP growth and private consumption growth is modeled. The baseline 
model includes annual growth rates to capture short-term impacts of debt on growth. In addition, a 
long-term analysis is added by supplementing yearly data with five-year (non-overlapping) growth 
periods. Lastly, the model explores nonlinear relationships by including squared debt variables.  
 
The results point to a relationship between both public and private debt and growth. However, the 
relationship differs in the short- and long-term and is more complex for private debt. Overall, few 
robust results are found for household and corporate debt. The main finding is that public debt 
growth seems to pose a larger issue for economic growth in the short-term, while there should be a 
greater concern regarding household debt growth in the long-term. Both in the short-term and long-
term analysis, negative nonlinear relationships between growth of public and private debt and GDP 
growth are present. For that reason, reductions of debt are associated with higher GDP growth, 
while debt accumulation is associated with lower GDP growth. However, the results are only 
significant on the short-term basis. The negative effect on GDP growth from both public and private 
debt operates primarily through lower capital and TFP growth. Regarding private consumption, 
some evidence is provided to the notion that both public and private debt growth crowds out private 
investments, reducing capital accumulation and long run growth. 
 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two provides background information on trends of 
private and public debt, as well as potential explanations to the developments. Chapter three presents 
the theoretical framework and outlines the potential channels of impact from debt to growth. 
Chapter four presents the data and research method used. Chapter five presents the empirical results, 
divided into descriptive evidence and both a short-term and long-term analysis. Ultimately, chapter 
six outlines concluding remarks.  
  
 4 
2 Trends of public and private debt  
 
Advanced countries have witnessed a rise of indebtedness for the last three decades. Even though it 
is difficult to point to a specific cause, this increased borrowing has coincided with deeper financial 
market liberalization (Reinhart et al., 2012). Figure 1 shows average aggregate non-financial sector 
debt, and its composition, as a percentage of GDP between the years 1980-2014. Each year shows an 
average of the twenty advanced economies6 used in the sample. Total debt is combined debt for 
government, household and (non-financial) corporations, while total private debt incorporates both 
household and (non-financial) corporate debt7. For simplicity, I will refer to government and public 
debt interchangeably throughout this thesis.  
 
As shown in Figure 1, total debt as a percentage of GDP has increased substantially. Starting from 
approximately 130 percent of GDP in 1980, average total debt is now at levels of 270 percent of 
GDP. Mainly higher private debt drives this increase. More specifically, corporate debt accounts for 
100 percentage points, household debt for 75 percentage points and public debt for the remaining 90 
percentage points in 2014. Average annual growth rate of public debt is 1.7 percent between 1980 
and 2014, while it is 2.6 percent for private debt. Hence, there is an increasing trend of debt to GDP 
ratios.  
 
Figure 1. Average aggregate debt over the sample countries by sector, 1980-2014. 
  
 
                                                 
6 Countries included are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Singapore, Turkey and 
United States. 
7 Government debt refers to the ”general government” sector including central government debt (plus social 
security funds and extra budgetary-units), state and local government debt. Household debt also includes debt 
of non-profit institutions serving households and (non-financial) corporate debt includes the debt of public 
(non-financial corporations) (Bloch and Fall, 2015; and Dembiermont et al., 2013). 
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Incorporating both the public and private sector when studying debt sustainability is important, 
especially when analyzing developments of debt in connection to financial stress and crises (see e.g. 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; and Reinhart et al., 2012). As seen in Figure 1, public debt levels is 
relatively stable compared to private debt levels between 1995 and 2005. Private debt on the other 
hand illustrates an upward trend, with an annual average growth rate of 2.7 percent during the same 
period. However, when the financial crisis hits in 2007, there is a sharp increase in public debt, while, 
private debt halts, stabilizing at approximately 175% of GDP (which must originate in a nominal 
decrease since GDP fell after the crisis). Illustrating average annual growth rates of debt/GDP ratios 
for the sample countries in Figure 2 further confirms this pattern.   
 
Figure 2. Average growth rates in debt/GDP ratios over the sample countries by sector, 1980-2014.  
 
 
 
As seen in the top panel of Figure 2, the growth rate of public debt increases dramatically in 
connection to the financial crisis, while the decline in public debt after 2010 is less sharp than the 
decline in private debt. Notable is that there seems to be a negative covariation between public and 
private debt over time. In periods of low public debt growth there seems to be a period of high 
private debt growth and vice versa. This may reflect a countercyclical response of debt accumulation 
in periods of income movements (Barro, 1979). As highlighted previously, financial crisis (often 
preceded by a private sector boom) constrains government budgets and may trigger public debt 
increases to unsustainable levels. In addition, there are theories stating that the public perceives 
public debt as private debt, since public debt accumulation equals higher tax payments in the future. 
Hence, when public debt increases, households and corporations should reduce their share of private 
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debt in order to be able to meet future tax increases (see e.g. Friedman, 1987; and Barba and Pivetti, 
2009).   
 
As pointed out in Pescatori et al. (2014), it is important to study the debt trajectory of countries, as 
some countries experience increasing growth rates of debt while others have decreasing growth rates, 
potentially affecting economic growth differently. As is seen in the bottom panel of Figure 2, average 
growth rates of household debt are fairly stable within the time period, except between 1995-2007 
where a clear upward trend is shown. Average growth rate of corporate debt fluctuates somewhat 
more and there is a stronger credit boom and bust pattern in connection to the crisis. Growth rates 
of public debt are more volatile throughout the period also showing more distinct boom and bust 
patterns. This also relates to mitigating business cycles and/or periods of financial instability, often 
by meeting economic downturns with increased spending financed by higher indebtedness (see e.g. 
Abbas et al., 2013).  
 
Even though it is difficult to point to any specific cause of the increasing trend of indebtedness, it 
coincides with some important economic developments during the investigated period. To start, 
financial market activity and lending became less restricted and liberalized from the 1980s and 
forward. Together with technological developments and improvements, an innovative financial 
sector progressively developed. This led to a more efficient allocation of risk and a stable credit 
supply. Hence, increased indebtedness of the world has moved in tandem with financial reform 
(Cecchetti et al., 2011; Taylor, 2012; and Dynan et al., 2005). Figure 3 provides evidence to this 
notion by plotting historical data on public debt (solid line) between the years 1950-2014. There is a 
clear increasing trend of indebtedness beginning in the 1980s, as indicated in the shaded area. Taylor 
(2012) calls this era the “Age of Credit”. Interestingly, there is no increasing trend of annual average 
GDP growth in the sample countries (dashed line) during this “financiation” of the world economy. 
 
Figure 3. Average public debt and GDP growth over the sample countries, 1950-2014.  
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Additional explanations to the increased trend of borrowing relates to the decline of worldwide real 
interest rates in the 1990s. The global savings glut hypothesis by Ben Bernanke tries to explain this new 
low interest rate era as a consequence of excess saving compared to investments in emerging 
markets, a preference that arose due to poor social safety nets and an ageing population (see e.g. 
Bernanke 2005; Bernanke et al., 2011; and Eichengreen, 2014)8. Last, tax policies might play an 
important role. Deductions of interest rates payments and tax reliefs for mortgage interest payments, 
along with subsidies, can explain the increased borrowing within both the corporate sector (which 
rather issue debt than equity) and the household sector (Cecchetti et al., 2011). Additional 
explanations to increased household debt relates to demographic changes in advanced countries, 
where demand for housing rises with baby booms (see e.g. Akerlof and Shiller, 2010). Research by 
Azzimonti et al. (2014) also points to a relationship between income inequality and increased 
borrowing, where higher income inequality leads to higher indebtedness. Whatever cause, the 
consequences prove clear. Governments, households and corporations have accumulated debt 
during a time of less financial regulations and there seems to be a strong interplay between public 
and private debt.    
  
                                                 
8 See also the secular stagnation hypothesis by Larry Summers. However, this theory calls for even lower real 
interest rates, by lowering nominal rates below zero, to depart from stagnation (see e.g. Summers, 2015). 
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3 Debt and economic growth  
 
A variety of theoretical and empirical research models that links debt and growth exist. The 
conventional view is that debt (reflecting deficit financing) can stimulate aggregate demand and 
output in the short run, but crowds out capital and reduces output in the long run (Kumar and Woo, 
2010). This paper focuses on both the short and long run effects of debt on growth. It is important 
to note that there is a clear interaction between public and private debt. For instance, the public 
sector’s ability to sustain a given level of debt depends on its fiscal capacity 9 , which can be 
compromised if the private sector is highly indebted (Cecchetti et al., 2011, and Eggertson and 
Krugman, 2012).  
 
Previous theoretical and empirical studies indicate several channels through which public and private 
debt can affect growth. This paper focuses on five main channels of impact relating to consumption 
smoothing, capital and technology, crowding out effects, crises, and brain drain. The first two 
channels have a positive effect on growth, while the last three channels have a negative effect on 
growth.  
 
First, borrowing can help individuals, firms and governments to smooth consumption over time when 
incomes, sales and expenditures are variable. Public debt, in particular, can help smooth 
consumption across generations and hence reduce macroeconomic volatility10. To the extent that 
future generations will be richer than current ones, through a combination of more human capital 
and productive technology, society’s intertemporal welfare increases when consumption is 
transferred from future to current generations (Cecchetti et al., 2011). By increasing the current 
disposable income of households, and in turn their lifetime wealth, aggregate demand is boosted 
(Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). Even with rising public debt levels, there is a positive effect on 
growth since the tax rise needed to fund higher consumption is postponed. Hence, debt through 
deficit financing can boost aggregate demand and output, at least in the short run (Cecchetti et al., 
2011; Kumar and Woo, 2010; and Traum and Yang, 2010).  
 
Second, debt facilitates investments that in turn boost growth by increasing capital and technology 
(Pattillo et al., 2004). As debt ease credit constraints faced by governments, households, and firms, 
there is a weaker dependency on domestic and private savings (Lane and Pels, 2012; Cecchetti et al., 
2011). In addition, risk diversification increases as the financial system develops, improving capital 
allocation throughout the economy (Klein and Olivei, 2008; and Panizza, 2013). Hence, increased 
funds raise capital and facilitate the introduction and replacement of existing technology, boosting 
both the capital stock and TFP, which in turn affects growth positively.  
 
Conversely, the effect on growth from debt can be negative. According to the third channel of 
impact, debt might crowd out private investments, mainly through increased consumption (Reinhart et 
                                                 
9 The possibility to raise taxes to service the debt (Cecchetti et al., 2011).  
10 For instance, by financing lower taxes with increased indebtedness in economic downturns.   
 9 
al., 2012). The argument is easiest explained in a closed economy set-up, but holds for open 
economies as well11 (Bricongne and Mordonu, 2015). If a government increases debt, i.e. reduces tax 
revenues and holds spending constant, then the budget deficit will increase and public savings 
decrease. If private savings and/or capital inflows do not increase enough12 to offset government 
borrowing, national savings decline and so forth total investment. Reduced investments affect the 
capital stock and labor productivity negatively, which in turn implies lower output and income 
(Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999; Traum and Yang, 2010). The same reasoning holds for the private 
sector, where increased private consumption from higher private debt should reduce private savings 
and investments (Claessens et al., 2011; Borio, 2012; and Barba and Pivetti, 2009). Similarly, high 
debt burdens at the corporate level restrains turnover and investment growth, as profits planned for 
new investments are used to service existing liabilities (Randveer et. al., 2011).   
 
The reasoning above also relates to debt overhang theories giving support to the crowding out channel 
(see e.g. Koeda, 2006). If there is a likelihood that future debt levels will be larger than the repayment 
ability, investors lower their expectations of returns as future taxes will be higher and progressively 
more distortionary to repay the debt. Thus, domestic and foreign investment is discouraged (Pattillo 
et al., 2002 and 2004). In addition, higher debt levels are more likely to be associated with higher 
long-term interest rates13, higher inflation14, and greater uncertainty and macroeconomic volatility 
affecting capital accumulation negatively (Kumar and Woo, 2010). This suggests that the nonlinear 
effects of debt on growth are likely to occur through lower capital accumulation (Pattillo et al., 2004, 
see also Krugman, 1988; and Sachs 1989). The crowding out of both public and private investments 
should also constrain growth by lowering TFP. For instance, investment strategies and productivity 
may be less efficient as additional government spending does not need to match additional tax 
revenue when increasing debt. In addition, when uncertainty increases, investment can be 
misallocated to activities with quick returns, neglecting a longer run focus (Pattillo et al., 2004; and 
Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). The way in which finance impact economic growth may also depend 
on whether lending finance investment in productive assets or feed speculative bubbles (Arcand et. 
al., 2015).  
 
Forth, increased debt can induce financial instability and crises through higher risk-taking and 
macroeconomic volatility (Arcand et al., 2015, Schularick and Taylor, 2012; and Rajan, 2005)15 . 
Borrower’s ability to repay becomes progressively more sensitive to changes in income, sales and 
interest rates as debt levels increase. In addition, creditworthiness may decrease as debt accumulates 
                                                 
11 With perfectly integrated financial markets, there should not be any correlation between national savings 
and national investment. However, Feldstein and Horioka finds in their famous paper from 1979 that such a 
correlation does exists, though it is weaker with deepening of financial globalization.   
12 There are theories stating that the increase in private savings will perfectly match the fall in public savings, 
commonly referred to as the Ricardian equivalence (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999).  
13 Baldacci and Kumar (2010) find that higher deficits and public debt lead to a significant increase in long-
term interest rates.  
14 See also Cochrane (2011) for an analysis of government debt and fiscal and monetary policy. 
15 See Easterly et al. (2000) for the relationship between financial depth and output growth volatility. 
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to unsustainable levels (Cecchetti et al., 2011). In the case of a credit crunch, the probability of 
defaulting increases with higher debt burdens, which might trigger debt, banking and/or currency 
crises (Cecchetti et al., 2011; Kumar and Woo, 2010; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012; and Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2011). In the case of a crisis, there will be a cycle of decreased consumption and 
investment and the drop in aggregate demand will be larger the higher the level of debt (Cecchetti et 
al., 2011). As aggregate demand and sales drop, companies are forced to respond, affecting 
unemployment rates (Randveer et. al., 2011). Hence, high indebtedness may increase financial 
fragility and raise volatility in the real economy. What might be seen is a credit-fuelled boom and a 
default-driven bust, similarly to the 2007 financial crisis (Cecchetti et al., 2011).  
 
The last channel identified relates to the problem of a brain drain as the financial sector increases. A 
growing financial sector may lead to a suboptimal allocation of talents, as a bigger financial sector 
attracts talents from the productive sector of the economy and therefore becomes inefficient from 
society’s point of view (Kneer, 2013). Manufacturing sectors that are either R&D-intensive or 
dependent on external finance suffer disproportionate reductions in productivity growth when 
finance booms (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015). In addition, because finance is a traded sector, 
countries may specialize in providing financial services to the rest of the world (Arcand et al., 2015). 
That is, when rents increase, including economic benefits from branches such as legal and 
accounting services that cluster around financial centers, the financial sector develops more quickly 
at the expense of the real economy16 (Kneer, 2013). This in turn increases financial volatility without 
benefitting long run growth through reduced TFP (Arcand et al., 2015; Beck et al., 2014; and 
Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015).  
 
In conclusion, public and private debt can affect growth either in a positive or a negative direction. A 
positive effect can operate through higher consumption and investments. A negative effect can 
operate through a crowding out effect on private investments, increased financial volatility and crisis 
as well as reduced productivity as the financial sector grows bigger. In addition, we may see different 
effects on the short- and long-term. Generally, positive effects on growth are more likely in the short 
run, while negative effects should be seen on the longer run due to the distortionary effects on both 
capital and TFP (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). Also, these effects are likely to be amplified as debt 
accumulation increases, hence, nonlinear effects should be present (Pattillo et al., 2004). 
 
  
                                                 
16 Philippon and Reshef (2013) show that the size of the financial sector is positively correlated with the 
presence of rents associated with working in the sector. 
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4 Data and method 
 
4.1 Data 
With the aim to reflect the theoretical channels of impact in Chapter 3, the empirical approach in this 
thesis combines growth regressions with regressions on potential sources of growth. Such growth 
accounting exercises have been commonly used in previous research (see e.g. Fisher, 1993). As 
previously discussed, debt can affect growth both in a positive and a negative direction. Both effects 
likely runs through the channels of capital and TFP as debt can boost (private) consumption and 
investments in the shorter run (raising capital and technology) but crowd out private savings and 
investments in the log-run through higher private consumption. Hence, in order to capture the full 
impact of debt on growth, four dependent variables are considered; GDP growth, capital stock growth, 
TFP growth and private consumption growth. To estimate the effect of debt on growth, observations from 
20 advanced economies17 between the years 1980-2014 is included. The data for the variables is 
mainly collected from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank 
(WB). Capital stock is constructed with data on gross fixed capital formation using the standard 
perpetual inventory method (assuming a common and constant depreciation rate of five percent). 
TFP is constructed with data on share of gross capital formation and persons employed using a 
residual method, see Appendix 2 for derivations. 
 
The main explanatory variables of interest are public and private debt measured as total debt (both 
public and private debt), credit to private non-financial sector (total private debt), gross general government debt 
(total public debt), credit to households and credit to non-financial corporations. Hence total debt includes 
government, household and corporate debt, while credit to the private (non-financial) sector includes 
credit to both the household and corporate sector. The original series are presented as percentage of 
nominal GDP and have been applied in previous research (see e.g. Cecchetti et al., 2011; and 
Buttiglione et al., 2014). Data on credit to the private sector is collected from BIS18, while data on 
government debt is collected from the IMF. In terms of lenders, the credit series includes lenders 
from all sectors of the economy, domestic banks and non-residents. In terms of financial 
instruments, credit consists of core debt defined as: (i) loans; (ii) debt securities; and (iii) currency and 
deposits. Further, liabilities are reported on a gross basis (Dembiermont et al., 2015). The series are 
presented on a consolidated basis for public debt, i.e. claims and liabilities between government 
entities such as state and local level are netted out (Bloch and Fall, 2015; and Dembiermont et al., 
2015). On the other hand, private sector debt is reported on a non-consolidated basis. If not, the 
                                                 
17 The availability of data on primarily private and public debt dictates the sample size and most importantly 
the choice of countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Singapore, Turkey and 
United States.  
18 The credit series from BIS are on a quarterly basis, hence averages were calculated in order to receive annual 
data.  
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measured level of credit would be understated as private sector lending to a large extent involves 
lending relationships within the same (private non-financial) sector (Dembiermont et al., 2013).  
 
Additional explanatory variables included in the empirical model are chosen in line with previous 
research (see e.g. Cecchetti et al., 2011; Kumar and Woo, 2010; and Checherita-Westphal and 
Rother, 2012). This thesis takes into account the “core set” of growth determinants including inflation 
measured by CPI inflation, general government consumption expenditure as a proxy for government size, 
population as a proxy of country size, trade openness (sum of exports and imports as a percent of GDP) 
as a proxy for economic integration, average years of schooling as a proxy for human capital and gross 
national savings (see also Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004). In reflection to the finding that debt accumulation 
relates to crises19, which in turn relates to lower growth, this thesis controls for economic crises by 
including an index consisting of data on banking, currency, debt (domestic and external), and 
inflation crises developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). In addition, as the population structure 
changes with higher ageing dependencies, there should be an upward pressure on savings, in turn 
affecting debt levels and growth. Therefore, an age dependency ratio is included in line with Cecchetti et 
al. (2011) and Kumar and Woo (2010). Last, the long-term interest rate capturing the effect of monetary 
policy and the current account balance is included in line with Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012).  
 
For a complete list of variables included, description and sources, see Appendix 2. To be able to 
interpret estimates in terms of elasticities, all variables (except those expressed as percentage shares) 
are logged. Due to lack of data, some variables (capital share and schooling) are linearly 
interpolated20.  
 
4.2 Models and research method 
In order to measure the effect of debt on growth, a dynamic panel data model with both fixed 
country and time effects21 is included. Accounting for dynamic processes, i.e. that the dependent 
variable rely on its past realizations, is suitable in growth models since the economic performance in 
a specific year should rely on the performance in previous year. The baseline model measures annual 
growth rates, capturing the short-term effect of debt on growth. As outlined in the theoretical part, 
the effect on growth can differ in the short- and long-term. Therefore, a long-term analysis is added 
by supplementing yearly data with seven non-overlapping five-year periods22, in line with previous 
research (Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012). To include five-year non-overlapping growth rates 
is common in growth regressions and reduces potential effects of cyclical movements (Cecchetti et 
al., 2011). As discussed in section 4.1, four models are estimated. The first model estimates the direct 
impact of debt on GDP (Y) growth: 
 
                                                 
19 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find for instance that public debt increases in connection to banking crises. 
20 This is not expected to affect the results to any large extent since variables such as capital share and 
schooling do not vary significantly over time. 
21 By using fixed effects, it is possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity between countries and measure 
the impact on growth within a given country (Cecchetti et al., 2011). 
22 Periods are 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2010, 2010-2014.  
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∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝜌𝑌∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑌∆𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑌∆𝐷𝑖𝑡−1
2  + 𝜃𝑌∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 is a vector with five one-period lagged debt variables including credit to households, 
(non-financial) corporations, governments, total private sector, and total debt (both public and 
private); 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1
2  is the same vector squared to capture nonlinear effects in line with previous research 
and the theoretical framework; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector including the controls (i.e. population, trade openness, 
age dependency, government consumption, inflation, national savings, current account balance, crisis 
index, schooling and the long-term interest rate), 𝜆𝑖 is the country-specific fixed effects allowing the 
countries to have individual intercepts; 𝛿𝑡 measures the time dependent fixed effects; and last 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is 
the error term. The same set-up holds for the following models.  
 
The second model analyzes the effect of public and private debt on capital accumulation (K) growth, 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑖𝑡) = 𝜌𝐾∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝐾∆𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝐾∆𝐷𝑖𝑡−1
2  + 𝜃𝐾∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2)  
 
The third model analyzes the effect of public and private debt on total factor productivity (A) 
growth, 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑖𝑡) = 𝜌𝐴∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝐴∆𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜏𝐴∆𝐷𝑖𝑡−1
2  + 𝜃𝐴∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
Last, the fourth model analyzes the effect of public and private debt on household consumption (C) 
growth:   
 
∆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝐶∆𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐶∆𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝐶∆𝐷𝑖𝑡−1
2  + 𝜃𝐶∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
To estimate the causal effect on growth, two estimation methodologies are considered: a system 
GMM estimator (henceforth SGMM) and a bias corrected OLS estimator (henceforth BOLS)23. The 
estimators are chosen with the aim of controlling for biases associated with both the panel data 
model setting and the regressors included in the model. As pointed out in previous research, a 
problem of endogeneity is likely to exist when estimating the effect of debt on growth. There are 
three main sources of endogeneity; measurement errors, omitted variable bias and reverse causality 
(Verbeek, 2012: 141-146). Previous literature has especially highlighted the problem of reverse 
causality when studying debt and growth, as slower growth (possibly due to a recession) can lead to 
higher debt buildup, rather than high debt lowering growth (Easterly, 2001). In addition, a dynamic 
panel bias is present in dynamic estimations since the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the 
fixed effects in the error term, leading to inconsistent estimates of OLS24. Both estimators address 
the issue of endogeneity, though in different ways. The BOLS estimator handles endogeneity caused 
                                                 
23 The GMM estimator is widely used in previous research (see e.g. Pattillo et al., 2004; and Cecchetti et al., 
2011).  
24 If a country is hit by a negative supply chock, which for some reason is not modeled in a given year, the 
shock appears in the full disturbance term 𝑣𝑖𝑡  = 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. Everything else equal, the fixed effect for that country 
will appear to be lower. The year after, lagged GDP growth and the fixed effect will both be lower. Hence, 
there is a positive correlation between a regressor and the error, which violates an important assumption for 
consistency of OLS (Roodman, 2009).  
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by the model, i.e. the dynamic panel bias when including a lagged dependent variable. The SGMM 
estimator on the other hand handles both endogeneity caused by the lagged dependent variable and 
other regressors included, hence the SGMM estimator is more general compared to the BOLS 
estimator (see Roodman, 2009 and Bruno, 2005a).  
 
The SGMM estimator is based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, also known as difference 
GMM (DGMM). The DGMM estimator transforms the models in first differences and includes 
lagged levels of the dependent and endogenous variables as instruments. Hence, both unobserved 
heterogeneity in the fixed effects25 (from including 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) and endogeneity among other regressors is 
controlled for. The general moment condition is E(Zi∆εi) = 0, where Zi is a matrix of instruments. To 
increase efficiency, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a system 
GMM by adding an assumption that first differences of instruments are uncorrelated with the fixed 
effects 26 . This allows the usage of first differenced instruments in the level baseline model to 
instrument 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1  and other endogenous variables. Hence, by adding the moment condition, 
E( ∆Zit−1εi ) = 0, more instruments are allowed. Thus, suitable lagged differences of both the 
dependent variables and endogenous regressors can be used to instrument the equation in levels, in 
addition to the instruments for the first-differenced equation (Roodman, 2009; Verbeek, 2012:402-
403).  
 
The GMM estimator is consistent, but like other instrumental variable approaches it generally suffers 
from poor small sample properties as it is difficult to find truly exogenous instruments in finite 
samples. In addition, the endogenous variables may be overfitted as the instruments easily become 
numerous. The consequence is that specifications tests, such as the Hansen J-test for over-identifying 
restrictions tends to become misleading27 (Verbeek, 2012:403; and Roodman, 2009). To reduce this 
problem, the lagged dependent variables and all five debt variables are instrumented with only two 
lags. In addition, the GMM estimator is found using a positive weighting matrix. This matrix can 
either be specified in a one-step procedure were homoscedasticity is assumed, or in a two-step 
procedure where no such assumption is made (Roodman, 2009). The problem of too many 
instruments is more distinct in the two-step estimator because it relies on a high dimensional optimal 
weighting matrix (Verbeek, 2012:403). Consequently, a one-step SGMM estimation is chosen for this 
thesis.  
 
The GMM approach generally works best with large N and small T, which is not typical for 
                                                 
25 Defining the full disturbance term as 𝑣𝑖𝑡  = 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, the fixed effects 𝜆𝑖 is removed when transforming the 
model into first differences ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑣𝑖𝑡 . 
26 This assumption is not trivial and may not hold in the case of growth models since it would imply that 
lagged growth levels are not correlated with country fixed effects. That is, when controlling for covariates, 
faster-growing countries should not systematically be closer or farther away from their steady states than 
slower-growing ones (Verbeek, 2012: 403; Roodman, 2009). However, as this thesis only includes advanced 
economies, the importance of this assumption may decrease since most of the countries included should be 
close to their steady state level.   
27 For instance, the Hansen J-test can generate exceptionally good p-values of one, i.e. meaning that the 
overall validity of the instruments is perfect (Roodman, 2009). 
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macroeconomic panel data (Cecchetti et al., 2011). Therefore, the analysis is complemented with a 
BOLS estimator to be able to draw any robust conclusions. It computes bias corrected least-squares 
dummy variables (LSDV) estimates and their bootstrap variance-covariance matrix for dynamic 
panel data models (Bruno, 2005a). The main difference from the SGMM estimator is that the BOLS 
estimator assumes strictly exogenous regressors, and hence only correct for dynamic panel bias from 
including lagged dependent variables. However, the BOLS estimator works better with small samples 
and often outperforms the GMM estimators in terms of root mean squared error and bias (Bruno, 
2005a; Judson and Owen, 1996; and Kiviet, 1995). The BOLS is estimated in two main steps. First, 
the initial estimates of the lagged dependent variables and the explanatory variables are obtained 
using the Blundell Bond (BB)-estimator, which is the one-step SGMM described above including 
internal instruments to correct for endogeneity arising from including a lagged dependent variable. 
Second, the estimates obtained are used to calculate the bias approximations and thus receive the 
bias corrected LSDV estimates (Bruno, 2005a and 2005b).  
 
Cross-section data often suffers from problem of heteroskedasticity, while non-stationarity and 
autocorrelation is common in time-series data (Verbeek, 2012: 97, 112, 338). Robust standard errors 
are included in all regressions to account for heteroskedasticity. Since the purpose is to estimate the 
effect on economic growth, all variables are transformed into growth rates by differentiating. This 
further facilitates the correction for non-stationarity. Results from stationary tests are presented in 
Appendix 3. The full disturbance term, 𝑣𝑖𝑡  = 𝜆𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , is presumed to be autocorrelated since it 
contains fixed effects. The estimators are designed to eliminate this source of trouble as described 
above. Yet, if the errors 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are serial correlated it would render some lags invalid as instruments. The 
Arellano/Bond test for autocorrelation is thus included in the regressions, which is valid for any 
GMM regression on panel data, including OLS (Roodman, 2009). The results are presented in 
Appendix 6 and 7 with the short-term and long-term results for the control variables and further 
discussed in section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. In line with previous research, only the AR(2) test results is 
presented since second order correlation in differences indicates first-order serial autocorrelation in 
levels28.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
28 Negative first-order serial correlation is expected in differences since ∆𝑣𝑖𝑡 is related to ∆𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 via the shared 
𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 term (Roodman, 2009).  
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5 Empirical results  
 
5.1 Descriptive evidence  
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the regression analysis are presented in Appendix 4. 
Analyzing the debt variables, the summary statistics show that the average annual growth rate of 
public debt to GDP is 1.7 percent and for private debt it is 2.6 percent. Disaggregating private debt 
into household and corporate, average household debt grows at a faster annual rate of 1.4 percent, 
while corporate debt grows at 1.2 percent. As preliminary evidence, scatter plots of the relationship 
between public and private debt growth and the four dependent variables are presented. For a more 
thorough analysis of the relationship between these variables, a full correlations matrix is provided in 
Appendix 5.  
 
To start, Figure 4 illustrates scatter plots of the relationship between growth of public debt and 
GDP, capital, TFP and private consumption growth using data on 5-year periods, hence the 
preliminary analysis is made on the longer run.  
 
Figure 4. Preliminary examination of public debt. 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4 there is a negative correlation between public debt and GDP growth, as 
expected according to previous research (see e.g. Kumar and Woo, 2010). Hence, higher rates of 
public debt growth relate to lower GDP growth. Further, there is a negative relationship between 
public debt and capital stock growth and TFP growth. The scatter plots (and the correlations 
coefficients in Appendix 5) indicate that the correlation is weaker for capital stock growth (the 
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correlations coefficient is -0.26 for capital growth, compared to -0.37 for TFP growth). Last, public 
debt and private consumption correlates positively. This provides some preliminary evidence of the 
third channel of impact discussed in the theoretical part, that higher public debt boosts consumption 
but crowds out private savings and investments. As illustrated, public debt seems to have a negative 
effect on GDP growth by lowering both capital and TFP growth.   
 
Figure 5 investigates the relationship between growth of private debt and GDP, capital, TFP and 
private consumption growth. 
 
Figure 5. Preliminary examination of private debt. 
 
 
 
Analyzing private debt, a different pattern arise and the relationships are less clear. Compared to 
public debt, private debt growth is nearly uncorrelated with GDP growth in the longer run (the 
coefficient is -0.0030). However, there is a positive correlation between private sector debt growth and 
capital stock growth. Similarly, there is a positive but weak relationship between private debt growth 
and TFP growth (the correlation coefficient is 0.02) as well as private consumption growth (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.05). Having a quick look at the correlation matrix for 5-year averages in 
Appendix 5, household debt growth seems to be positively correlated with GDP growth, while 
corporate debt growth is negatively correlated with GDP growth. This seems to originate from a 
negative correlation between corporate debt and TFP. However, no significant correlations are found 
for either household or corporate debt and hence a more sophisticated anlysis is needed.  
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5.2 Regression results   
Below follows the empirical regression analysis of the effect of private and public debt on economic 
growth. The regression results are divided into two sub-sections representing short- and long-term 
effects. Short-term effects are measured using annual growth rates, while long-term effects are 
measured using five-year, non-overlapping, average growth periods. Each sub-section includes 
results of all four models: the effects on GDP growth, capital stock growth, TFP growth and private 
consumption growth. Estimates from both the SGMM estimator, presented in the left column, and 
the bias corrected OLS (BOLS) estimator, presented in the right column, are provided. The inclusion 
of two estimation methods checks the robustness of the results. In all models and specifications, 
non-linear effects are estimated using squared debt variables.  
 
Since the main focus of this thesis is to provide insights to the relationship between debt and growth, 
a thorough analysis of the control variables is left to the interested reader. The short-term estimates 
of the control variables are presented in Appendix 6, while the long-run estimates are presented in 
Appendix 7. In addition, test-specifications relating to the estimators – the Arellano/Bond test for 
autocorrelation as well as the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions – are presented in 
Appendix 6 and 7 as well together with the controls. Hence, the regression output below will only 
consists of relevant debt variables. However, each sub-section ends with a discussion on the overall 
fit of the model and the performance of the estimators.  
 
5.2.1 Short-term effects 
Table 1 presents the main results of the short-term effects on economic growth from government, 
household and corporate debt growth. To illustrate the dynamics between government and total 
private debt on the one hand, and government, household and corporate debt on the other hand, 
three main specifications are presented. In order to get a general understanding of debt’s effect on 
growth, specification (1) presents the results for total debt growth. Specification (2) includes both 
public and private debt growth. Last, total private debt is divided into household and corporate debt, 
and hence specification (3) includes government, household and corporate debt growth. The same 
setup holds for specifications (4) - (6) when using the BOLS estimator. Each model is discussed 
separately and a short summary will end the short-term analysis.  
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Table 1. Baseline results for the short-term analysis. 
 SGMM1/ BOLS2/ 
Dependent variable: GDP Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total debt 0.02 
(0.01) 
  0.03** 
(0.01) 
  
Total debt squared -0.30*** 
(0.10) 
  -0.51*** 
(0.07) 
  
Public debt  
 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Public debt squared  -0.91*** 
(0.18) 
-0.85*** 
(0.17) 
 -1.16*** 
(0.14) 
-1.16*** 
(0.14) 
Private debt  0.02 
(0.02) 
  0.01 
(0.02) 
 
Private debt squared  -0.08 
(0.14) 
  -0.17 
(0.13) 
 
Household debt    0.03 
(0.04) 
  0.04 
(0.04) 
Household debt squared   0.95 
(0.85) 
  1.10 
(0.78) 
Corporate debt     -0.04* 
(0.02) 
  -0.00 
(0.03) 
Corporate debt squared   -0.01 
(0.22) 
  -0.26 
(0.23) 
Dependent variable: Capital stock growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total debt   -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
  -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
  
Total debt squared -0.02** 
(0.01) 
  -0.02** 
(0.01) 
  
Public debt  -0.00* 
(0.00) 
-0.00** 
(0.00) 
 -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Public debt squared  -0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Private debt  -0.00** 
(0.00) 
  -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
 
Private debt squared  0.04* 
(0.02) 
  0.04** 
(0.01) 
 
Household debt    0.00 
(0.00) 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
Household debt squared   0.01 
(0.09) 
  0.01 
(0.8) 
Corporate debt     -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
  -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Corporate debt squared   0.05** 
(0.02) 
  0.04* 
(0.02) 
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 SGMM1/ BOLS2/ 
Dependent variable: TFP growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total debt   -0.14 
(0.11) 
  
-0.05 
(0.09) 
  
Total debt squared -0.71 
(0.50) 
  
-0.74 
(0.60) 
  
Public debt 
 
-0.45*** 
(0.16) 
-0.40*** 
(0.15) 
 
-0.00 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
Public debt squared 
 
-4.74*** 
(1.32) 
-4.76*** 
(1.28) 
 
-3.16*** 
(1.18) 
-3.09*** 
(1.10) 
Private debt 
 
-0.07 
(0.16) 
  
-0.18** 
(0.13) 
 
Private debt squared 
 
-0.06 
(0.99) 
  
0.32 
(1.09) 
 
Household debt  
  
0.61*** 
(0.21) 
  
0.50 
(0.35) 
Household debt squared 
  
-5.05 
(5.86) 
  
0.72 
(6.22) 
Corporate debt   
  
-0.26 
(0.16) 
  
-0.45** 
(0.20) 
Corporate debt squared 
  
1.59 
(0.99) 
  
1.37 
(1.84) 
Dependent variable: HH Cons growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total debt   -0.01 
(0.01) 
  
-0.00 
(0.00) 
  
Total debt squared -0.00 
(0.03) 
  
-0.00 
(0.03) 
  
Public debt 
 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Public debt squared 
 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
Private debt 
 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
  
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
 
Private debt squared 
 
0.08* 
(0.05) 
  
0.03 
(0.05) 
 
Household debt  
  
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
  
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
Household debt squared 
  
0.89*** 
(0.24) 
  
0.84*** 
(0.31) 
Corporate debt   
  
0.01 
(0.01) 
  
0.01 
(0.01) 
Corporate debt squared 
  
-0.09 
(0.06) 
  
-0.11 
(0.09) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
1/ For SGMM estimations: all debt variables lagged one period 
2/ For BOLS estimations: all debt variables lagged one period; estimator chosen is the Blundell and Bond (BB) with no intercept; bias 
of order 1 included which forces an approximation up to O(1/T); number of bootstraps equal 1000. For more information, see Bruno 
(2005a) 
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Generally, the results of the effect on GDP growth are largely consistent considering both types of 
estimators. Few differences in size, sign and significance levels of the coefficients are shown and 
hence the majority of the results can be viewed robust considering both types of estimators. The 
general impression is that there are strong negative nonlinear effects from debt on GDP growth. 
Total debt growth shows a significant negative nonlinear effect, where higher growth of total debt is 
associated with lower annual GDP growth. The same holds for public debt growth, which is in line 
with previous research (see e.g Eberhart and Prosbiter, 2015; and Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 
2012). This result is robust considering both estimators. Regarding private debt, a negative nonlinear 
effect on GDP growth is found as well. Hence, some evidence of previous empirical findings 
showing that lower levels of public debt have a positive effect on growth, while higher levels are 
hurtful are provided for both public and total private debt29, even though the positive linear effects 
are less significant. In addition, the negative nonlinear effects are larger than the positive linear 
effects.  
 
In order to illustrate these nonlinear relationships, Figure 6 plots the development of GDP growth as 
growth of both public and total private debt increases. No such relationship is found for either 
household or corporate debt and therefore only the development of total private debt is plotted.   
Analyzing the data set, average annual repayments of public and private debt rarely exceeds one 
percent. Hence, Figure 6 plots the development of GDP growth as both public and private debt 
growth increases from repayments of one percent to accumulation of three percent.  
 
Figure 6. Developments of GDP growth rates from higher debt growth in the short-term.  
 
As seen above, there is a strong nonlinear relationship between public debt growth and GDP 
growth. As public debt is repaid/decreases, there is a positive effect on growth. On the other hand, 
as public debt accumulates through higher growth rates, there is a sharp negative effect on growth. 
                                                 
29 Assuming that lower growth rates are associated with lower levels of debt, which must not be the case.  
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This provides some evidence of the findings of Pescatori et al. (2014) that highlight the importance 
of the debt trajectory. The same pattern holds for private debt, even though the relationship is less 
distinct and non-significant - reductions are associated with higher GDP growth and accumulation is 
associated with lower GDP growth. Disaggregating total private debt into household and corporate 
debt, the picture is more complex and there is only one significant result found for corporate debt. 
Corporate debt growth is always associated with lower GDP growth, which is in line with the results 
found in Cecchetti et al. (2011). On the other hand, household debt growth is associated with higher 
GDP growth. This stands in contrast to Cecchetti et al. (2011) that found a negative linear effect 
(however, they estimate a long run effect). Hence, the results show a negative effect on GDP growth 
from both private and public debt in the shorter run. Moving on to investigate the effect on capital 
growth, TFP growth and consumption growth, should facilitate the interpretation of these results.   
 
Regarding the effect on capital growth, the results are once again robust over the estimators. There is 
a negative nonlinear effect from total debt growth. The same holds for public debt growth. Unlike 
the results for model 1, there is also a negative linear effect – hence, total and public debt growth is 
always associated with lower capital stock growth. Once again, the nonlinear effects are larger. The 
short run negative relationship between public debt and capital growth is in line with previous 
research (see e.g. Pattillo et al., 2004). Hence, as suggested by Pattillo et al. (2004), the negative effect 
from public debt growth on GDP growth partly seems to operate through lower capital 
accumulation. That is, even in the short run, investments seem to be crowded out and/or 
discouraged as public debt accumulates.  
 
Regarding private debt, the relationship is almost the opposite. Higher growth of total private debt is 
robustly associated with higher capital growth, as expected from the second channel of impact 
stating that increased debt should increase investments, boosting the capital stock. Interestingly, 
there are linear significant negative effects on capital growth from private debt. Hence, the 
relationship seems to be U-shaped. The same holds for corporate debt. This relationship is intuitive 
in the short run. At lower growth rates of private debt accumulation or even repayments of debt, the 
capital accumulation is slower and as results shows even negative. However, as private debt 
increases, there should be a positive effect on investments, as in this case on corporate investments, 
boosting the capital stock. Household debt growth seems to be associated with higher capital 
growth, however no significant results are found.   
 
Regarding the effect on TFP growth, similar patterns as with model 1 and 2 arise. Growth of total 
debt is associated with lower TFP growth (however non-significantly). Public debt growth on the 
other hand significantly lowers TFP growth, which is in line with previous research (see Checherita-
Westphal and Rother, 2012). Before proceeding, some notes need to be made. For some 
specifications in model 3, coefficients and standard errors are large and point to problems of 
misspecifications. An effort to mitigate these problems were made by introducing longer (or no) lag 
lengths on debt variables and longer (or no) dynamic effects, no sign of improvement was shown 
though. Running the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation for the specifications, some indication 
of serial correlation is provided (the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation is rejected 
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on a five percentage level). In addition, the Hansen J-test for over-identifying restrictions provides 
“perfect” p-values of one, indicating that we cannot reject the null of instruments being exogenous. 
However, this implies that the instruments overfit the endogenous variables according to Roodman 
(2009). Hence, instruments included in this mode are weak, which should be taken into 
consideration. Therefore, the results for model 3 should be interpreted with some caution.  
 
The negative nonlinear effect from public debt growth on TFP growth provides some evidence of 
the theoretical channels of impact, even on the short-term. As discussed previously, investment 
strategies and productivity may be less efficient as additional government spending does not need to 
be matched by instant higher tax revenue when increasing debt (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). 
Further, as uncertainties increase, investments are misallocated to activities with quick returns 
(Arcand et. al., 2015). Similarly, there is a negative relationship between total private debt growth and 
TFP growth, no robust results are found though. The last theoretical channel stating that TFP may 
decrease due to a reduction of skilled labor in the productive sectors of the economy, as the financial 
sector and rents associated with it grows (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015), could explain this. 
Regarding household and corporate debt, no real conclusions can be drawn as few significant and no 
robust results are found. Corporate debt seems to affect TFP growth negatively, while household 
debt seems to be associated with higher TFP growth.  
 
Effect on household consumption  
Last, the effect on private consumption is analyzed. Incorporating private consumption contributes 
to a broader understanding of the debt-growth nexus, since analyzing this effect may capture the 
crowding out effect of private savings and investments from both higher public and private debt. 
Literature on the subject has established a relationship between debt and consumption but the 
direction of the effect is debated. Mian et al. (2015) finds a positive relationship between household 
debt and consumption, while Berben and Brosens (2005) find a negative relationship between public 
debt and private consumption (the level of debt is analyzed though).  
 
Overall, the output provides few significant results compared to earlier models. Growth of total debt 
is associated with lower private consumption. Similar results are found for public debt growth, 
having a negative nonlinear effect on private consumption, non-significant though. However, there is 
a positive significant linear effect on consumption growth from public debt (although not robust). 
Hence, there is some indication that public debt growth increases consumption in the short run. The 
opposite holds for total private debt. There are negative linear significant effects, while nonlinear 
effects are positive and significant from total private debt growth. Hence, higher growth of private 
debt leads to higher household consumption. The same results are found for household debt, which 
is in line with previous research (Mian et al., 2015). No significant results for corporate debt are 
found, but growth of corporate debt seems to be associated with lower household consumption 
growth.  
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Summary  
In conclusion, short-term effects found are in line with previous research but seems to partly go 
against theory. Generally, there are negative nonlinear effects on GDP growth from both public and 
private debt (though non-significant for private debt). Hence, there is no support to the first two 
theoretical channels of impact pointing to positive effects on growth in the shorter run. Rather 
results points to positive linear effects on GDP growth from public and private debt. Hence instead 
of finding different effects on the short- and long-term, the results indicate that the difference of the 
effect lies in the amount of debt accumulation, at least when analyzing the effect on GDP growth. 
Regarding public debt, there are negative and robust nonlinear effects in all four models. Hence, the 
negative effect on GDP growth from public debt operates through lower capital growth, lower TFP 
growth and lower private consumption growth. Regarding private debt, fewer significant results are 
found and the effect on growth is complex. Nonlinear effects on GDP growth from private debt 
growth is less distinct compared to public debt. In accordance with theory, private debt growth 
boosts capital growth in the short-term, but lowers TFP. Hence, the negative effect on GDP growth 
from private debt mainly operates through lower TFP growth. This might be an indication of the last 
channel of impact, that a greater financial sector drains the economy of productive workers, lowering 
TFP (Arcand et. al., 2015). 
 
Regarding household and corporate debt, few robust results are found, but household debt seems to 
affect GDP growth positively in the short run through both the capital and consumption channel, 
while corporate debt affects GDP growth negatively in the short run mainly through the capital and 
TFP channel. That is, corporate debt growth seems to drive the negative nonlinear effect on short-
term growth from total private debt. This might be because corporate debt affects the capital stock 
and TFP to a larger extent than household debt, that according to previous research rather affects 
growth through a consumption channel (see Mian et al., 2015 and Barba and Pivetti, 2009). 
Regarding the fewer significant results for household and corporate debt, the obvious explanation 
lies in the shortage of data for some countries included in the analysis. For a handful of countries, 
data is partly missing, making it more difficult to determine the relationship. This, of course, also 
relates to the less significant results for total private debt.  
 
Appendix 6 reports R-squared values30 together with the result on the control variables. Computation 
of goodness-of-fit measures is fairly uncommon when using panel data since usual and adjusted R-
squared are appropriate only when estimating OLS (Verbeek, 2012: 386). In addition, the R-squared 
takes into account the fixed effects, which to a large extent perfectly fit the variation (or at least 
capture it). Hence, R-squared values tend to be high and somewhat misleading (Verbeek, 2012: 387). 
In addition, few reports on the R-squared are made in previous research when using the SGMM 
estimator (see e.g. Kumar and Woo, 2010). High R-squared values are confirmed when using annual 
growth rates. The independent variables explain between 50-70 percent of the variation in GDP, 
capital, TFP and consumption growth for both estimators. Pattillo et al. (2004) uses a comparable 
                                                 
30 Calculated as the squared correlation coefficient between actual and fitted values (Verbeek, 2011: 386). 
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model and gets similar results31. However, the R-sqaured should not be used to evaluate the model, 
rather than cautiously facilitate the choice of specifications (Verbeek, 2012: 387).   
 
Importantly, some points need to be made regarding the discussion on the validity of the instruments 
in section 4.2. The specification tests – including the Arellano/Bond test for autocorrelation and the 
Hansen J-test for over-identifying restrictions – provide some inconclusive results on the short-run. 
Even though the number of instruments are reduced to include only two lags, the Hansen J-test for 
over-identifying restrictions provides p-values of one for the majority of the specifications when 
including annual data, hence the instruments seem to overfit the endogenous variables (Roodman, 
2009). Even though several efforts to mitigate this problem were made by modifying the model, by 
including higher dynamic lags and/or reduce the number of lags and instruments as a sensitivity 
check, no improvements were shown. As stated in Roodman (2009), the Hansen test should not be 
relied upon too faithfully, as such specification tests tend to become misleading as the number of 
instruments increase. However, the implication is that the validity of the instruments cannot properly 
be assessed, which should be taken into consideration. On the other hand, there is not any major 
difference between the estimators with regards to the estimates, which indicates that endogeneity 
may not be a large problem in the shorter run.32  
 
Furthermore, there is little indication of serial correlation in the errors. The Arellano/Bond test for 
autocorrelation cannot reject the null of no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
error terms in the majority of cases. P-values range between 0.12-0.55 for the specifications analyzing 
the effect on GDP, capital and consumption growth, for both estimators. As already discussed, there 
are signs of serial correlation in the model on TFP growth, where the AR(2) p-values ranges between 
0.02-0.06 for both estimators. That is, the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation is 
rejected on a ten-percentage level and hence the instruments included in the regressions in model 3 
are weak. Hence, in general there are no major signs of misspecifications but the validity of the 
instruments can be questioned, which is common when using internal instruments.  
 
5.2.2 Long-term effects  
Table 2 presents the main results for the long-term effects of private and public debt on growth. The 
set-up is identical to the one in section 5.2.1. Appendix 7 presents the results for the control 
variables and the specification tests. Similar to the setup in the previous section, this section 
discusses each model separately with a short summary in the end.  
 
  
                                                 
31 Their measure of the R-squared value is 1-RSS/TSS.  
32 Since the BOLS estimator only handles endogeneity caused by the model structure, including a lagged 
dependent model, there should be differences in the results from both estimators if the explanatory variables 
are strongly endogenous.  
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Table 2. Baseline results for the long-term analysis. 
 SGMM1/ BOLS2/ 
Dependent variable: GDP Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total debt   0.01 
(0.04) 
  -0.10 
(0.04) 
  
Total debt squared -0.13 
(0.42) 
  -0.16 
(0.36) 
  
Public debt  0.09 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
 -0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.00 
(0.08) 
Public debt squared  -0.31 
(0.61) 
-0.47 
(0.54) 
 -0.17 
(0.74) 
-0.40 
(0.79) 
Private debt  0.03 
(0.04) 
  -0.01 
(0.04) 
 
Private debt squared  -0.23 
(0.33) 
  -0.05 
(0.40) 
 
Household debt    -0.14* 
(0.08) 
  -0.24** 
(0.12) 
Household debt squared   1.67 
(1.33) 
  2.93 
(2.31) 
Corporate debt     0.07 
(0.06) 
  0.08 
(0.06) 
Corporate debt squared   -0.95 
(0.60) 
  -0.40 
(0.89) 
Dependent variable: Capital stock growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total debt   0.04 
(0.02) 
  0.06** 
(0.02) 
  
Total debt squared -0.14 
(0.13) 
  -0.18 
(0.19) 
  
Public debt  -0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
 -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
Public debt squared  -0.38 
(0.26) 
-0.41** 
(0.20) 
 -0.36** 
(0.17) 
-0.39** 
(0.17) 
Private debt  -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 
Private debt squared  0.44*** 
(0.11) 
  0.36*** 
(0.12) 
 
Household debt    -0.06*** 
(0.02) 
  -0.03 
(0.04) 
Household debt squared   0.73 
(0.47) 
  0.93 
(0.72) 
Corporate debt     -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.04** 
(0.02) 
Corporate debt squared   0.60** 
(0.25) 
  0.44 
(0.28) 
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 SGMM1/ BOLS2/ 
Dependent variable: TFP growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total debt   -0.19 
(0.25) 
  0.06 
(0.36) 
  
Total debt squared -0.88 
(2.31) 
  -1.71 
(3.04) 
  
Public debt  -0.83** 
(0.40) 
-0.34 
(0.27) 
 -0.40 
(0.49) 
-0.18 
(0.55) 
Public debt squared  -6.06** 
(2.96) 
-7.24*** 
(2.54) 
 -10.32** 
(4.26) 
-10.34** 
(4.63) 
Private debt  -0.21 
(0.25) 
  -0.02 
(0.34) 
 
Private debt squared  -0.86 
(1.79) 
  -0.39 
(3.06) 
 
Household debt    -0.86* 
(0.50) 
  -1.09 
(0.95) 
Household debt squared   -0.17 
(6.77) 
  7.88 
(19.41) 
Corporate debt     0.10 
(0.24) 
  0.71 
(0.50) 
Corporate debt squared   -0.61 
(3.69) 
  0.16 
(7.46) 
Dependent variable: HH Cons growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total debt   -0.02 
(0.01) 
  -0.00 
(0.01) 
  
Total debt squared 0.00 
(0.09) 
  -0.03 
(0.09) 
  
Public debt  -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
Public debt squared  0.19* 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
 0.19 
(0.14) 
0.22 
(0.14) 
Private debt  -0.01 
(0.01) 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
 
Private debt squared  0.03 
(0.10) 
  -0.08 
(0.10) 
 
Household debt    -0.02 
(0.02) 
  0.00 
(0.03) 
Household debt squared   0.03 
(0.39) 
  0.16 
(0.61) 
Corporate debt     -0.01 
(0.01) 
  -0.01 
(0.02) 
Corporate debt squared   0.01 
(0.26) 
  -0.29 
(0.23) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
1/ For SGMM estimations: all debt variables lagged one period 
2/ For BOLS estimations: all debt variables lagged one period; estimator chosen is the Blundell and Bond (BB) with no intercept; bias 
of order 1 included which forces an approximation up to O(1/T); number of bootstraps equal 1000. For more information, see Bruno 
(2005a) 
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In the long-term analysis, there seems to be a greater discrepancy between the two estimators 
compared to the short-term analysis. The largest differences relate to significances of coefficients, 
rather than size and sign. However, it is important to note that there are fewer significant and robust 
results on the longer run. This is further discussed in the summary. Higher growth of total debt 
relates to lower GDP growth, the results are non-significant though. Non-linear effects are smaller 
on the longer run compared to the short-term analysis. There are no significant nonlinear effects on 
GDP growth from public debt growth on the longer run. Pescatori et. al. (2014) found similar 
results. The same holds for private debt, where no significant results are found on GDP growth 
from private debt growth in the long run (which was indicated in the preliminary analysis where a 
small but negative correlation was shown). The nonlinear relationship between public and private 
debt and GDP growth is plotted in Figure 7 using the coefficients for the SGMM estimator, in order 
to illustrate the relationship as in the short-term analysis. Important to note is that the nonlinear 
relationships are not robust over the estimators.  
 
Figure 7. Developments of GDP growth rates from higher debt growth in the long-term. 
 
As seen above, the nonlinear effects of public and private debt moves much closer, compared to the 
short-term analysis. The effect from public debt is now smaller – as public debt growth reaches three 
percent, GDP growth falls with only 2.5 percent, compared to eight percent in the short-term 
analysis. On the other hand, there is a sharper nonlinear effect from private debt growth, though 
insignificant, compared to the short-term analysis. As private debt growth reaches three percent, 
GDP growth reduces with two percent, compared to one percent in the short-term analysis. Hence, 
the negative effect on growth from private debt is larger in the long-term. Important to note is that 
only household debt provides significant effects on GDP growth. Growth of household debt has a 
linear negative effect on GDP growth. No significant coefficients for corporate debt are found. 
Hence, on the longer term there seems to be a greater reason to worry about household debt 
accumulation.  
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Regarding the effect on the capital stock, public debt growth has both linear and nonlinear significant 
negative effects on capital growth. These results are robust. Compared to the short-term analysis, the 
nonlinear effects are larger. Hence, once again support is given to the theoretical channels of impact 
pointing to a negative effect on capital accumulation, and the support is stronger on the longer run. 
Similar to the short-term analysis, the relationship between capital growth and total private debt is U-
shaped – lower growth of private debt is associated with lower capital growth, while higher growth 
of private debt is associated with higher capital growth. The same holds for corporate debt. The 
nonlinear long-term positive effects on capital growth are larger than the short-term effects. Thus 
even on the long-term, private and corporate debt boosts the capital stock, which is somewhat 
unexpected according to the theoretical reasoning. Regarding household debt, there are linear 
negative effects on capital growth, although no robust results are found. Hence, on the long-term, 
the negative effect on GDP growth from household debt seems to partly operate through a negative 
effect on capital growth. 
 
Similar to the results in the short-term analysis, large standard errors for the estimates in model 3 
points to some misspecification. Once again, an effort to correct this through different types of re-
specifications of the model was made, but no improvements were found. That is, results should be 
interpreted with some caution. Once again, public debt growth is significantly associated with lower 
TFP growth. The same holds for private debt growth, yet no significant results are found. Regarding 
household and corporate debt results are inconclusive, and once again only household debt provides 
significant results, however not robustly. Opposite to the result in the short-term analysis, household 
debt affects TFP growth negatively in the long run.  
 
Effect on household consumption  
In the longer run, higher public debt growth affects private consumption growth positively, contrary 
to the short-term effect. The nonlinear significant result is not robust over the estimators though. 
However, the long run positive effect on consumption growth from public debt is in line with 
previous research (Gogas, 2014)33. The results for total private debt are inconclusive, and no robust 
or significant results are found. The same holds for corporate and household debt. Generally, 
household debt seems to be associated with higher consumption growth, while corporate debt seems 
to be associated with lower consumption growth.   
 
Before continuing, some notes on the results on private consumption should be made. Both in the 
short- and long-term analysis, few significant results are retrieved. The most intuitive explanation to 
this is the problem of endogeneity (see Berben and Brosens, 2005). As discussed in Johnson and Li 
(2007), debt might not have a direct impact on household consumption, but instead capture the 
relationship between consumption and income. Omitted variable bias is addressed in the SGMM 
estimator by including internal instruments. As already discussed, the SGMM estimator can be 
subject to a small sample bias due to weak instruments, which should be taken into consideration. In 
                                                 
33 Gogas (2014) finds that there is no empirical evidence of the Ricardian-equivalence hypothesis - that 
households should consume less and save more as governments accumulate debt - in the longer run. 
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addition, the results differ to some extent between the two estimators, providing some evidence that 
endogeneity is present, since the BOLS estimator does not address endogeneity among regressors 
included except the lagged dependent variable. When running the Arellano/Bond test for 
autocorrelation, there is no indication of serial correlation with p-values ranging between 0.23 and 
0.43 for both estimators. However, the Hansen J-statistic provides p-values of one in the short-term 
analysis and high p-values of 0.93-0.96 in the long-term analysis, which is a sign of trouble. Hence, 
this implies that the Hansen J-test is unable to detect weather the instruments are exogenous or not 
due to overfitting, which should be taken into consideration.   
 
Summary  
In conclusion, the results on the long-term are similar to the short-term analysis, even though some 
interesting differences stand out. Important to highlight is that there are fewer significant and robust 
results regarding long-term effects. A potential explanation relates to the importance of the time 
dimension when measuring the effect of debt on growth, rather than its cross-sectional explanatory 
power (Pattillo et al., 2004). The choice of including five-year non-overlapping averages is based on 
previous research (see e.g. Cecchetti et al., 2011). However, there is the possibility that longer time-
periods are needed in order to capture the effect. In addition, it is important to highlight that the 
number of observations reduce when measuring the effect using 5-year averages, in turn affecting the 
possibility to detect any significant relationships (Behr, 2003).  
 
Considering public debt growth, there are still negative nonlinear effects on GDP, capital and TFP 
growth in the long run, however smaller and non-significant. Contrary to the short-term analysis, 
higher public debt growth is associated with higher household consumption growth. Once again, few 
significant and robust results are found for private debt growth. Notable is that household debt growth 
pose a larger problem for growth in the longer run compared to the short run. Growth of household 
debt significantly lowers GDP, capital and TFP growth, while it boosts consumption growth. Hence 
the larger nonlinear negative effect on GDP growth from total private debt growth seems to be driven 
by household debt. Similar, corporate debt affects growth negatively, mainly through the capital 
channel, however few robust results are found.  
 
Hence, also in the longer run, support is given to the theoretical channels pointing to a negative 
effect on growth. The positive effect from public debt on consumption growth confirms the third 
channel of impact – that higher public debt crowds out private investments in the longer run. This 
crowding-out effect is likely captured in the stronger negative effect on growth from private debt. 
Hence, higher private consumption crowds out private savings, which reduces resources available for 
the corporate sector, in turn reducing investments and affecting capital accumulation negatively (as 
shown corporate debt affects growth negatively mainly through the capital channel). As previous 
research finds, private credit cycles move in tandem with house price cycles. Thus, as property values 
increase, households are likely to feel richer, consuming more and saving less (since house loans 
constitute a large share of household debt) (Rajan, 2005; Claessens et al., 2011; and Borio, 2012). As 
shown in the results, this affects investment negatively, in turn lowering capital accumulation and 
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long run growth. Hence, as stated in Panizza (2013), it is possible that “the ‘too much finance’ result 
of Arcand et al. (2012) is really a ‘too much household finance’ result”. 
 
Hence, in the short run, growth of public debt seems to be a bigger problem for growth, while on 
the longer run, a larger focus should be put on the effects from household debt growth. A potential 
explanation to this result may lie in the role of financial crisis in the debt-growth nexus. As described 
in the theoretical part, private debt expansions are good predictors of financial crisis as they increase 
economic volatility and instability (Taylor, 2012). In addition, the increasing trend of private debt has 
moved in tandem with credit market deregulation and financial liberalization (Reinhart et al., 2012; 
Barba and Pivetti, 2009; and Taylor, 2012). The link between credit booms and financial instability 
can be explained by the failure of regulating the financial system (Schularick and Taylor, 2012). Lax 
regulation encourages higher risk-taking among actors (Rajan, 2005), and the quality of lending 
deteriorate as credit tend to go to weak public and private enterprises and the real estate market, 
feeding bubbles (Zagha and Nankani, 2005). This was seen both in the United States and in many 
European countries in connection to the financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis. In addition, once 
the private debt accumulation becomes unsustainable and defaults starts spreading, there usually is a 
countercyclical response of public debt increases to meet fiscal constraints. The stronger short-term 
negative effect of public debt can then relate to government debt financing transfers (such as taxes 
and social benefits), rather than boosting public consumption and investment in the short run, where 
the latter have a more direct effect on growth (Nautet and van Meensel, 2011). 
 
For the interested reader, an important and fairly unexplored topic for the future would be to further 
relate credit expansions and booms to financial liberalization and deregulation, since both have 
moved in tandem for the last three decades. For instance, are there any combined effects of credit 
expansion and financial liberalization on growth? In addition, disaggregating private debt further by 
studying both length and composition of loan contracts may provide important insights, for instance 
in terms of understanding the effect on both consumption and investments. However, the research 
of debt is still constrained due to the lack of comprehensive data (Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015), 
even though important contributions on historical debt data have been provided recently by for 
instance Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).      
 
Regarding the overall fit of the model, high R-squared values are confirmed also in the long-term 
analysis, even though they are weaker compared to the short-term analysis. When using five-year 
averages, the overall goodness of fit ranges between 30-50 percent. This is in line with previous 
research (see Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012) 34. The weaker explanatory power is likely due 
to the lower variance when measuring the effect using five-year average growth rates compared to 
annual growth rates. Compared to the short-term analysis, the Hansen J-test for over-identifying 
restrictions provides high p-values, but not as high as one. The p-values range between 0.25-0.96. 
The higher p-values are found for the specifications incorporating more variables, i.e. the ones 
                                                 
34 Even though no goodness-of-fit measure for the effect on capital stock, TFP and consumption is provided 
in their study. 
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incorporating government, household and corporate debt, hence, the result is not surprising. 
However, such high p-values are a sign of trouble and thus also in the longer run the Hansen J-test is 
unable to assess the validity of the instruments included.  
 
There is no indication of serial correlation on the long-term though, as the null hypothesis of no 
second-order serial correlation cannot be rejected for any of the specifications. Once again, the 
AR(2) p-values are lower when modeling the effect on TFP (p-values ranges between 0.11-019). 
Hence, the instruments in model 3 are weak also in the longer run. Lastly, as discussed in the 
beginning of the sub-section the results from the different estimators differ to a larger extent in the 
long run analysis compared to the short run. Since the BOLS estimator only controls for endogeneity 
caused by the model structure, the results may differ between the two estimators if endogeneity is 
present among regressors other than the dependent variable. Hence, there seems to be a larger 
problem of endogeneity among the variables included in the longer run. Since the test for 
autocorrelation fails to detect any serial correlation, the instruments included should be valid. 
However, as indicated by the Hansen J-test there is a problem of over-identification of the 
endogenous variables, which should be taken into consideration. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
 
The increased indebtedness of advanced countries for the last three decades has resulted in an 
important debate regarding the sustainability of both public and private credit expansion. This 
became further relevant in connection to the global financial crisis in 2007, that was preceded by a 
rapid expansion of private credit and proceeded by an expansion of public sector credit (Schularick 
and Taylor, 2012). The interplay between public and private debt has so far been fairly unexplored, 
even though important contributions on the subject has been made (see e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009 as well as Reinhart et al., 2012).  
 
The scope of this thesis is to provide further insights to the relationship between public 
(government) and private (household and corporate) debt and economic growth. This is done 
through an empirical approach investigating short- and long-term effects, nonlinear relationships, as 
well as potential channels through which the impact is likely to occur focusing on capital stock, TFP, 
and private consumption. On the one hand, debt can affect growth positively through consumption 
smoothing and increased capital and technology. On the other hand, debt accumulation can affect 
growth negatively through a crowding out effect on private investments, increased financial volatility 
and crisis as well as a brain-drain in productive sectors of the economy as the financial sector grows. 
 
In the short-term analysis, this thesis finds nonlinear relationships between both public and private 
debt and GDP growth. Reductions of debt are associated with higher GDP growth, while 
accumulation of debt is associated with lower GDP growth. The relationship is stronger for public 
debt compared to private debt in the shorter run. The negative effect on GDP growth from public 
debt growth operates through lower capital growth, lower TFP growth and lower household 
consumption growth. Regarding private debt, the relationship is more complex. The negative effect 
on GDP growth from private debt seems to mainly operate through a negative effect on TFP growth. 
Few robust results are found for household and corporate debt, but household debt seems to affect GDP 
growth positively in the shorter run through both the capital and consumption channel, while 
corporate debt affects GDP growth negatively in the shorter run mainly through the capital and TFP 
channel.  
 
Similar results emerge in the long-term analysis, even though some interesting differences stand out. 
Notable is that in the longer run, household debt growth seems to pose a larger problem. There are 
still negative nonlinear effects from public debt on GDP, capital and TFP growth, however smaller 
and non-significant. Contrary to the short-term analysis, higher public debt growth is associated with 
higher consumption growth. Most importantly, household debt growth significantly lowers GDP, 
capital and TFP growth, while it boosts consumption growth. Similar, corporate debt affects growth 
negatively, mainly through the capital channel. Hence, in the longer run there is a larger negative 
nonlinear effect on GDP growth from total private debt. The positive effect on consumption growth 
from both public and private debt provides evidence of the third channel of impact – that higher 
debt crowds out private investments. This crowding-out effect is likely captured in the stronger 
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negative effect on growth from private debt. Hence, higher private consumption crowds out private 
savings, which reduces resources available for the corporate sector, affecting capital accumulation 
and growth negatively. 
 
The results provide important policy insights. As private sector credit booms are regarded good 
predictors of financial crisis (Taylor, 2012; and Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012), the developments of 
household debt should be carefully monitored in the future. As found in previous research, the link 
between credit booms and financial instability partly lies in the failure of regulating financial markets 
(Schularick and Taylor, 2012). Lax regulation not only encourages higher risk-taking, it also reduces 
the quality of lending as more credit is directed to weak public and private enterprises and the real 
estate market, feeding bubbles (Rajan, 2005; Zagha and Nankani, 2005). In addition, with financial 
liberalization and freer capital flows, central banks largely lose control over interest rates, making 
increasing household debt problematic, as political reforms are needed to halt booms (Barba and 
Pivetti, 2009). As private credit cycles and house price cycles are strongly synchronized (Claessens et 
al., 2011), not only should developments of household credit be carefully monitored, but also the 
developments of housing markets. 
 
In addition, the results provide important insights to the relation between public and private debt. As 
outlined in the background, there usually is a pattern of countercyclical responses of public debt 
accumulation to meet fiscal constraints once private debt expansions become unsustainable. The 
significant short-term negative effect from public debt may then relate to government debt mainly 
financing transfers (such as taxes and social benefits) rather than boosting public consumption and 
investment in the shorter run, where the latter have a more direct positive effect on growth (Nautet 
and van Meensel, 2011). Hence, the instability related to private credit expansions can reduce the 
efficiency of public borrowing. Countries such as the United States, Spain, Portugal, and the United 
Kingdom have witnessed a decreasing trend of household debt in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. However, countries such as Australia, Sweden, Finland, France, Norway, Belgium and Korea 
still shows an upward trend, providing a warning sign for the future, especially since interest rates are 
still low in most parts of the world (BIS, 2015; and Chmelar, 2013). Hence, the importance of fiscal 
stimulus is likely to increase.  
 
So should we worry? Those who answer no might argue that financial reform and globalization has 
made it easier to carry high debt burdens. However, those who answer yes points to sharper volatility 
and crisis in debt markets (Reinhart et al., 2012). The advanced world has entered an era known by 
overhang of private and public debt. The recent crisis reminded us of what happens when there is a 
sudden stop of capital flows. Debt burdens increase dramatically and fiscal deficits rise with a deep 
recession as a result. With a slowly increasing FED-rate we might see capital flows reversing, flowing 
from emerging to advanced markets, potentially increasing imbalances (Wheatley and Kynge, 2015). 
In relation to this, interest rates will sooner or later have to be raised also in Europe, increasing the 
probability of another burst as households are sensitive to interest rate changes when debt levels are 
high (Andersson and Jonung, 2015). One thing is for sure, that monetary policy and financial stability 
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is highly interlinked and as the results of this thesis shows, both governments and central banks in 
advanced countries should worry about increased debt.   
 
Regarding future directions, views diverge. The majority highlight the need of debt deleveraging or 
debt restructuring, including raising the cost of credit and regulate capital flows (see e.g. Taylor, 2013, 
Reinhart et al., 2012; and see Engel (2012) for a discussion on capital controls). On the other hand, 
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) points to the problem of credit constraints, often imposed in times 
of crisis, being even more hurtful and reducing aggregate demand. Nevertheless, should lower 
growth caused by debt crises be cured with more debt? Important to highlight is that the demand for 
savings will not decrease in the future. The age dependency ratio increases in most advanced 
countries, resulting in higher health and social spending, in turn imposing an upward pressure on 
debt accumulation (Cecchetti et al., 2011).  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A3. Summary of empirical studies examining public and private debt and growth. 
Study 
 
Sample description, study period, 
and methodology 
Summary of empirical findings and 
conclusions 
Comments 
 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff 
(2010) 
Study the relationship between public 
debt, growth and inflation including 
44 advanced and emerging 
economies spanning almost 200 
years. They use a non-parametric 
method, comparing average real 
GDP growth rates across four groups 
of public/debt ratios: <30 %, 30-60 
%, 60-90 % and >90 %.  
Main findings are that in both advanced 
and emerging markets, debt/GDP >90 
% is associated with lower growth. For 
advance countries, median growth is 
almost 1 % lower for debt/GDP >90 % 
compared to lower debt ratio groups. For 
emerging markets, growth rates are cut in 
half when gross external debt 35  reaches 
debt/GDP levels  >90 %.   
No relationship between higher 
debt levels and inflation is 
found for advanced countries, 
however a relationship is 
detected in emerging markets. 
Herndon, 
Ash and 
Pollin (2013) 
Replicate Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
and correct for coding errors, 
selective exclusion of available data, 
and the weighting procedure of 
summary statistics.  
Main finding is that, when correcting for 
errors, average GDP growth for 
debt/GDP >90 % is 2.2 %, not -0.1 % as 
presented in RR. That is, compared to 
lower debt ratios, growth for high debt 
ratios is not radically different.  
Coding errors in RR excluded 
five countries, high and positive 
growth data in the top 
debt/GDP group for New 
Zealand, and weights in each 
group of debt levels was put 
equally by country, i.e. ignoring 
the number of years belonging 
to each group. 
Kumar and 
Woo (2010) 
Explore the impact of public debt on 
long run growth using a panel of 38 
advanced and emerging economies 
between 1970-2007. Methodologies 
considered include between 
estimator, pooled OLS, fixed effects 
panel regression, and SGMM 
dynamic panel regression. 
Main findings are that average annual 
GDP/capita decreases by 0.2 % in EMs 
when the initial debt/GDP is increased 
by 10 %, the effect is 0.15 % in advanced 
countries. Higher levels of initial debt 
show a proportional larger negative effect 
on growth and hence there is some proof 
of nonlinearity. 
The negative effect on growth 
originate from a slowdown in 
labor productivity growth 
(declines 0.2 % when initial 
debt/GDP increases with 10 
%), mainly due to reduced 
investment and a slower growth 
of capital per worker.  
Cecchetti, 
Mohanty and 
Zampolli 
(2011) 
Investigate all forms of non-financial 
debt: household, corporate and 
government debt and its effect on 
growth using a nonlinear approach. 
Sample includes 18 OECD countries 
from 1980 to 2010. Estimation 
method includes a dynamic fixed 
effects panel data regression model. 
Main results show a negative effect on 
growth from high public debt.  Estimates 
for corporate and household debt are 
imprecise. The threshold for government 
debt is 84 percent of GDP, for corporate 
debt it is 90 percent and for household 
debt it is 85 percent (though the results 
are inconclusive for household debt and 
should be interpreted carefully).  
In addition, a forecast including 
age dependency ratios is 
performed, to project public 
debt levels up until 2040. 
Assuming unchanged fiscal 
policy, debt quickly rises to 
debt/GDP ratios above 100 %, 
a level proven to affect growth 
negatively.  
Pattillo, 
Poirson and 
Ricci (2004) 
Investigate growth channels affected 
by debt, focusing on factor 
accumulation and TFP, including 
nonlinear effects. Dataset consists of 
61 developing countries over the 
period 1969-1998 using a dynamic 
panel specification including simple 
OLS, 2SLS, fixed effects and 
differenced and system GMM. 
Main results are that the negative effect 
on growth stems from both a negative 
effect on physical capital accumulation 
and TFP growth. A nonlinear effect is 
present with low debt levels having a 
positive effect on growth and TFP 
growth, while high debt levels have a 
negative effect. For physical capital, the 
negative effect is on average larger for 
higher debt levels.  
Capital accumulation accounts 
for about 1/3 of the effect of 
debt on growth, while TFP 
accounts for about 2/3. 
Eberhart and 
Presbiter 
(2015) 
Study the long run relationship 
between public debt and growth, 
searching for common or country-
specific non-linearity or thresholds. 
Main results show that countries with 
higher average debt/GDP ratios are 
more likely to get a negative effect on 
long run growth. However, there is no 
 
                                                 
35 Total gross external debt includes both private and public debt and is mainly denominated in foreign 
currency, compared to total public debt that mainly consists of domestic currency (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2010). 
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Study 
 
Sample description, study period, 
and methodology 
Summary of empirical findings and 
conclusions 
Comments 
 
Dataset consists of 118 advanced, 
emerging and developing countries 
between 1960-2012 using a dynamic 
non-linear model and a common 
correlated effects estimator. 
evidence of systematic nonlinearities 
within countries. Hence, no evidence of a 
common threshold is found. 
Panizza and 
Presbitero 
(2014) 
Study whether public debt has a 
causal effect on economic growth 
using a sample of 17 OECD 
countries. Estimation method 
includes an IV approach including a 
new instrument capturing valuation 
effects from exchange rate 
movements.  
Main findings are that no causal effect of 
public debt on economic growth is found 
when accounting for endogeneity. Hence, 
there is no country-specific threshold, 
above which debt affects growth 
negatively.  
The authors highlight that the 
results does not imply that any 
debt level is sustainable for a 
given country. 
Checherita-
Westphal and 
Rother 
(2012) 
Investigate a nonlinear relationship 
between public debt and GDP/capita 
growth using a sample of 12 Euro 
area countries between 1970-2010. In 
addition, growth channels are 
analyzed. Estimation methods 
include fixed-effects as well as IV 
techniques such as 2SLS and GMM.   
Main results are that a nonlinear 
relationship between public debt and 
growth is found, with a debt/GDP 
threshold level of 90-100 %, above which 
the effect on growth is negative. The 
non-linear impact on growth operates 
through the channels of private saving, 
public investment and TFP.   
 
Égert (2015) Examines the existence of threshold 
effects for the debt-growth nexus 
using data on both central and 
government debt between 1946-
2009. Estimation methods include 
bivariate and multivariate regressions 
as well as Bayesian model averaging.    
Little evidence of a negative nonlinear 
relationship is found. The results are 
sensitive to data coverage and modeling 
choices, but in rare cases when a negative 
relationship is found, it starts at public 
debt/GDP ratios between 20-60 %.  
 
Pescatori, 
Sandri and 
Simon (2014) 
Analyze threshold effects of public 
debt on growth. Using the IMFs 
historical data on public debt, dated 
back to 1875, the focus is on the 
long-term relationship between 
public debt and growth by analyzing 
growth performance up to 15 years 
after debt exceeds a specific 
threshold.  
No evidence of a threshold, above which 
medium-term growth is significantly 
changed, is found. However, the debt 
trajectory is important, as countries with 
lower debt appear to grow equally as fast 
as countries with high but declining debt. 
In addition, a relationship between higher 
debt and high output volatility is found. 
 
Arcand, 
Berkes and 
Panizza 
(2015) 
Examine a nonlinear relationship 
between financial development and 
growth using different datasets 
(country-level and industry-level) and 
empirical approaches (cross-sectional 
and panel regressions as well as semi-
parametric estimators) between 1960-
2010. 
Results show that there can be “too 
much” finance. When credit to the 
private sector reaches approximately 80-
100 percent of GDP, growth is affected 
negatively.  
 
Reinhart, 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff 
(2012) 
Examine growth associated with 
longer periods of exceptionally high 
public debt, defined as episodes 
where public debt to GDP exceeded 
90 percent for at least five years, 
between 1800-2011. 
Results show 26 episodes where public 
debt to GDP is > 90 % for at least five 
years. In 23 of these high debt episodes, 
growth is substantially slower. On 
average, debt/GDP levels > 90 % are 
associated with an average annual growth 
rate 1.2 % lower than in periods with 
debt/GDP < 90 %.  
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Table A2. Variables included in the analysis.  
Variable Unit Description Source Comment 
GDP USD Gross domestic product in constant 
2005 USD. The variable is logged and 
differentiated. 
WB - WDI  
Capital stock Thousands The variable is constructed from data 
on gross fixed capital formation using 
the standard perpetual inventory 
method, assuming a common and 
constant depreciation rate of five 
percent. The variable is logged and 
differentiated. 
WB – WDI and 
Nehru and 
Dhareshwar 
(1993) for initial 
value.  
The initial value was obtained by 
specifying 𝐾𝑡−1 = 
𝐼𝑡
0,05+ 𝑔𝐼
 where 
d=0.05 is the depreciation rate of 
capital and 𝑔𝐼  is the average 
growth rate of investments during 
1980-1990. The capital stock was 
further calculated as 𝐾𝑡 = 
0.95* 𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡 . In the case of a 
negative value of 𝑔𝐼 , it was set to 
zero. 
TFP Index The variable is constructed using data 
on share of gross capital formation (at 
current PPPs) from Penn World 
Tables 8.1 and persons employed (in 
thousands of persons) from the 
Conference Board. The variable is 
differentiated and data on share of 
gross capital formation had to be 
interpolated for the last three years.  
Conference 
Board, PWT 8.1 
and Aghion and 
Howitt (2009) 
Departing from a simple Cobb-
Douglas production function: 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 
𝐴𝑖𝑡(𝐾𝑖𝑡)
𝛼(𝐿𝑖𝑡)
1−𝛼  and rearranging 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑖𝑡)  = 𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡)  - 𝛼𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑖𝑡)  – (1 −
𝛼)𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑖𝑡) , an estimate on TFP is 
obtained by using data on capital 
formation share ( 1 − 𝛼)  and 
persons employed (𝐿𝑖𝑡)36. 
HH cons % of GDP Household final consumption 
expenditure. The variable is 
differentiated. 
WB - WDI  
Debt_HH % of GDP Credit to households and NPISHs 37 
from all sectors - market value38. The 
variable is adjusted for breaks and 
differentiated.  
BIS  
Debt_C % of GDP Credit to (non-financial) corporations 
from all sectors - market value. The 
variable is adjusted for breaks and 
differentiated. 
BIS  
Debt_public % of GDP Gross general government debt. The 
variable is differentiated.  
IMF Historical 
Public debt 
Database 
 
Debt_total % of GDP The sum of public debt and total 
private debt. The variable is 
differentiated. 
BIS and IMF 
Historical Public 
debt Database 
 
Debt_private % of GDP Credit to private (non-financial) sector 
from all sectors - market value. The 
variable is adjusted for breaks and 
differentiated. 
BIS  
Population Total The variable is logged and second 
differentiated. 
WB - WDI  
                                                 
36 See e.g. Reem Limam and Miller (2004) and Aghion and Howitt (2009:107) on obtaining TFP estimates. 
37 NPISHs stands for non-profit institutions serving households.  
38 Market value is the amount for which a creditor could exchange assets or settle a liability at any moment in 
time, and is the most common measure (Dembiermont et al., 2015).  
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Variable Unit Description Source Comment 
Schooling Years Average years of schooling for total 
population aged 15 and over. The 
variable is logged, second 
differentiated and interpolated (raw 
data only every five year). 
Barro and Lee  
Trade % of GDP Trade is the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services. The 
variable is differentiated.  
WB - WDI  
Age dependency % of 
working-age 
population 
Age dependency ratio is the ratio of 
dependents, people younger than 15 
or older than 64, to the working-age 
population, those ages 15-64. The 
variable is second differentiated.  
WB - WDI  
GG cons % of GDP General government final 
consumption expenditure. The 
variable is differentiated.  
WB - WDI  
Inflation  Index  Consumer price index (2010=100). 
The variable is logged and 
differentiated 
WB - WDI  
Savings % of GDP Gross national savings. The variable is 
differentiated.  
IMF-WEO  
CA balance  % of GDP Current account balance. The variable 
is differentiated.  
IMF-WEO  
Long interest 
rate 
% Long-term interest rates refer to 
government bonds maturing in ten 
years. 
OECD  
Crisis  Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The BCDI index is a combined index 
for banking, currency, debt (domestic 
and external), and inflation crises 39 . 
The index sums up the number of 
types of crises a country experience in 
a given year, i.e. the index takes the 
value zero if no crises is hit a given 
year, and five if experiencing all crises. 
When feasible, a stock market crash 
variable is added to the five-crises 
composite and in that case, the index 
runs from zero to six.  
Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) 
Note that the index does neither 
capture defaults on household 
debt nor corporate defaults. 
Though, these types of episodes 
may be captured in the banking 
crisis indicator.  
                                                 
39 The following definitions for the various types of crises are made in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Inflation 
crisis: inflation rates of 20 percent or higher. Currency crash: an annual depreciation to USD of 15 percent or 
more. Banking crisis: a bank run that leads to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or 
more financial institutions, or if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover or large-scale government 
assistance of an important financial institution. Debt crisis: the failure to meet a principal or interest payment 
on the due date. Stock market crash: a cumulative decline of 25 percent or more in real equity prices.   
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Table A3. Results for stationarity tests on annual growth rates. 
Variables GDP Capital stock TFP HH cons Debt_HH Debt_C Debt_public Debt_total Debt_private Pop 
Im–Pesaran–Shin test 
IPS -12.135*** -4.028*** -17.506*** -19.448***  -4.096*** -10.018*** -8.220*** -10.681*** -7.393*** -16.418*** 
IPS, trend -12.298*** -3.804*** -15.868*** -17.380*** -1.706** -8.070*** -5.945*** -8.385*** -5.311*** -14.320*** 
Augumented Dickey-Fuller unit root test (reporting inverse normal statistic) 
ADF -5.980*** -2.066** -8.849*** -10.976*** -1.393* -6.288*** -6.781*** -5.687*** -7.145*** -7.633*** 
ADF,trend -6.328*** -1.337* -7.151*** -8.859*** 2.023 -3.410*** -4.156*** -2.875*** -4.503*** -5.072*** 
Phillips–Perron unit-root tests (reporting inverse normal statistic) 
PP -12.692*** -1.262 -18.149*** -20.449*** -3.994*** -8.795*** -8.545*** -10.527*** -6.852*** -16.035*** 
PP,trend -12.062*** 0.210 -16.212*** -18.357*** -1.466* -6.251*** -6.075*** -7.921*** -4.553*** -13.615*** 
 
Variables Trade Age Dep GG cons Inflation Savings CA balance Crisis Schooling Long rate 
Im–Pesaran–Shin test H0: unit root, Ha: stationary 
IPS -19.411*** -13.040*** -17.149*** -9.728*** -21.609*** -20.280*** -14.109*** -20.257*** -17.939*** 
IPS, trend -17.026*** -11.009*** -15.1187*** -6.843*** -19.153*** -18.655*** -13.163*** -18.248*** -16.470*** 
Augumented Dickey-Fuller unit root test (reporting inverse normal statistic) H0: unit root, Ha: at least one panel is stationary 
ADF -12.437*** -5.651*** -9.301*** -5.785*** -11.457*** -9.956*** -5.260*** -1.864*** -9.298*** 
ADF,trend -10.349*** -2.958*** -7.159*** -3.472*** -8.919*** -7.290*** -3.604*** -5.408*** -8.279*** 
Phillips–Perron unit-root tests (reporting inverse normal statistic) 
 
H0: unit root, Ha: at least one panel is stationary 
PP -20.770*** -14.287*** -17.281*** -10.277*** -21.527*** -21.615*** -14.698*** -20.740*** -19.209*** 
PP,trend -18.644*** -11.984*** -15.221*** -7.160*** -19.117*** -19.443*** -13.515*** -18.390*** -17.210*** 
 
As can be seen in the above results, for the majority of the variables the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected and we can conclude that the variables are 
stationary, or at least do not contain a unit root. The analysis is based on variables transformed as described in Appendix 2. Due to unbalanced data, only three tests 
could be performed: The Im-Pesaran-Shin test, the Augumented Dickey-Fuller unit root test and the Phillips-Perron unit root test. The different tests show 
comprehensive results for all variables except capital stock, where the Phillips–Perron is unable to reject the null of a unit root. There is a wide array of research on 
which test outperforms the other and there is no clear-cut result. Hoang and McNown (2006) conclude that the IPS approach outperforms both ADF and PP while 
Maddala and Wu (1996) concludes the opposite. Since two out of three tests reject the null of a unit root, the tests conclude that capital stock is stationary.
 47 
Appendix 4 
 
Table A4. Descriptive statistics for annual growth rates.  
Variables Observations Mean Sd Min Max 
GDP 680 0.025 0.029 -0.093 0.142 
Capital stock 680 -0.001 0.010 -0.027 0.070 
TFP 680 0.010 0.214 -1.384 0.959 
HH cons 680 0.000 0.011 -0.077 0.059 
Debt_HH 623 0.014 0.023 -0.055 0.097 
Debt_C 623 0.012 0.043 -0.211 0.215 
Debt_public 680 0.017 0.052 -0.151 0.264 
Debt_private 674 0.026 0.055 -0.213 0.245 
Debt_total 623 0.042 0.071 -0.209 0.379 
Population 680 0.007 0.007 -0.017 0.053 
Trade 680 0.006 0.067 -0.794 0.410 
Age dependency 680 -0.001 0.006 -0.022 0.018 
GG cons 680 0.001 0.007 -0.022 0.031 
Inflation 680 0.052 0.087 -0.014 0.724 
Savings 680 0.000 0.018 -0.097 0.071 
CA balance  680 0.002 0.021 -0.115 0.125 
Crisis 700 0.526 0.787 0 5 
Schooling 680 0.011 0.010 -0.012 0.056 
Long interest rate 574 -0.003 0.012 -0.124 0.068 
      
Number of id 20 20 20 20 20 
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Table A5a. Correlation matrix for annual growth rates.  
 GDP Capital TFP HH cons Debt HH Debt C Debt GG Debt private Debt total 
GDP 1.00 
        
Capital 0.27* 1.00 
       
TFP 0.52* 0.11* 1.00 
      
HH cons -0.37* -0.13* -0.20* 1.00 
     
Debt HH 0.06 0.18* 0.08 0.16* 1.00 
    
Debt C -0.18* 0.22* -0.12* 0.18* 0.35* 1.00 
   
Debt GG -0.49* -0.22* -0.31* 0.21* -0.20* -0.06 1.00 
  
Debt private -0.11* 0.27* -0.05 0.17* 0.68* 0.92* -0.15* 1.00 
 
Debt total -0.47* 0.01 -0.30* 0.32* 0.39* 0.68* 0.62* 0.69* 1.00 
* p<0.01 
 
Table A5b. Correlations matrix for 5-year non-overlapping growth rates. 
 
GDP Capital TFP HH cons Debt HH Debt C Debt GG Debt private Debt total 
GDP 1.00 
        
Capital 0.35* 1.00 
       
TFP 0.38* 0.16 1.00 
      
HH cons -0.51* -0.29* -0.34* 1.00 
     
Debt HH 0.14 0.15 0.16 -0.00 1.00 
    
Debt C -0.12 0.21 -0.13 0.19 0.40* 1.00 
   
Debt GG -0.41* -0.26* -0.37* 0.36* -0.39* -0.22 1.00 
  
Debt private -0.00 0.25* 0.02 0.05 0.75* 0.91* -0.37* 1.00 
 
Debt total -0.35* -0.01 -0.33* 0.43* 0.40* 0.68* 0.47* 0.66* 1.00 
* p<0.01 
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Table A6 presents the short-term results for the control variables and includes the results for the 
specification tests – the Arellano/Bond test for autocorrelation and the Hansen J-test for over-
identifying restrictions. Results are presented for each dependent variable and specifications (1), (3), 
(5) and (7) are estimated with the SGMM estimator, while specifications (2), (4), (6) and (8) are 
estimated with the BOLS estimator. The majority of the controls are of expected sign and size 
according to previous research. Focusing on the effect on GDP growth, all significant controls are of 
expected sign. Trade openness and national savings significantly increases GDP growth, while the 
age dependency ratio, government consumption, and the crisis index significantly lower GDP 
growth. In addition, there is a significant positive effect from the lagged dependent variable as 
expected (see e.g. Cecchetti et al., 2011; Kumar and Woo, 2010; and Checherita-Westphal and 
Rother, 2012 for similar results on the controls).  
 
Table A6. Short-term regression results for control variables.  
 
Dependent variable GDP growth Capital stock growth TFP growth HH Cons growth 
 
SGMM1/ BOLS2/ SGMM BOLS SGMM BOLS SGMM BOLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged dependent variable, 
one period 
0.41*** 
(0.13) 
0.27*** 
(0.03) 
0.91*** 
(0.03) 
0.97*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
Population 
-0.31 
(0.76) 
-0.30 
(0.23) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-1.13 
(2.97) 
-1.75 
(1.74) 
-0.23 
(0.25) 
-0.26*** 
(0.09) 
Trade 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.12) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Age dep 
-1.15** 
(0.51) 
-0.57*** 
(0.19) 
-0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
2.85 
(5.38) 
2.53* 
1.40 
0.31 
(0.28) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
GG cons 
-1.25** 
(0.60) 
-0.85*** 
(0.16) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.58 
(2.43) 
-2.28* 
(1.20) 
0.21 
(0.15) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
Inflation 
0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
1.18** 
(0.52) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Savings 
0.47** 
(0.21) 
0.68*** 
(0.07) 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
4.03*** 
(1.42) 
6.95*** 
(0.50) 
-0.40*** 
(0.05) 
-0.35*** 
(0.03) 
CA balance 
-0.56*** 
(0.19) 
-0.57*** 
(0.05) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10*** 
(0.01) 
-7.98*** 
(0.82) 
-8.57*** 
(0.38) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
Crisis 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Schooling 
0.28 
(0.34) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-3.14* 
(1.75) 
-0.90 
(0.82) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
Long interest rate 
0.06 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
1.16 
(0.95) 
-0.11 
(0.48) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
Constant 
0.03*** 
(0.01)  
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
0.02 
(0.09) 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
Observations 
Number of id 
Number of instruments 
Arrelano-Bond AR(2) test 
(p-value) (i) 
Hansen J-test (p-value) (ii) 
R-squared 
561 
20 
96 
0.11 
 
1 
0.62 
542 
20 
86 
0.03 
 
 
0.61 
561 
20 
96 
0.68 
 
1 
0.64 
542 
20 
86 
0.24 
 
 
0.63 
561 
20 
96 
0.23 
 
1 
0.59 
542 
20 
86 
0.17 
 
 
0.60 
561 
20 
96 
0.67 
 
1 
0.55 
542 
20 
86 
0.19 
 
 
0.52 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
1/ For SGMM estimations: all debt variables lagged one period 
 50 
 2/ For BOLS estimations: all debt variables lagged one period; estimator chosen is the Blundell and Bond (BB) with no intercept; bias 
of order 1 included which forces an approximation up to O(1/T); number of bootstraps equal 1000. NOTE: The BOLS is estimated 
in two steps. In the first step, the initial estimates of the lagged dependent variable and the explanatory variables are obtained using the 
BB-estimator as described in section 4.2. The BB-estimator is a one-step SGMM and hence the number of instruments, the AR(2) p-
value, and the R-squared value relates to the first estimation. In the second step, the estimates obtained is used to calculate the bias 
approximations and thus receive the LSDVC estimates presented above. For more information, see Bruno (2005a) 
(i) The null hypothesis is that the first-differenced errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation.  
(ii) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous. For the BOLS estimator, no reporting on the Hansen J-test is 
made. The Hansen J-test is robust but is weakened by many instruments. For more information, see Roodman (2009). 
 
As described in section 4.2, the GMM estimator is consistent but may suffer from a small sample 
bias since truly exogenous instruments are difficult to find. In addition, the estimator is sensitive to 
the number of instruments. As stated in Roodman (2009), the Hansen test for over-identifying 
restrictions should not be relied upon too faithfully, because such specification tests tend to become 
misleading as the number of instruments increase. Even though the number of instruments were 
reduced, only including two lags of the dependent variables and exogenous debt variables, the 
Hansen J-test points to some error as p-values equals one (indicating that the instruments are 
“perfectly” exogenous). Even though several efforts to mitigate this problem was made by modifying 
the model and including higher dynamic effects and/or reduce the number of lags and instruments, 
no improvements were shown. Hence, the contingency of the instruments should be taken into 
consideration. However, by including the BOLS estimator the robustness of the results is checked. 
As seen in table A6, there are no major differences between the coefficients for the two estimators, 
other than that the estimates are smaller when using the BOLS estimator. 
 
Addressing the issue of autocorrelation, the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation provides p-values 
above 0.10 in the majority of the specifications in the short-term analysis, indicating that we cannot 
reject the null of no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced error term (Roodman, 
2009). This is an indication that the instruments included in the short-term analysis should be valid 
and that the misleading result of the Hansen J-test is rather grounded in the problem of overfitting 
the endogenous variables. In addition, as seen in Table A6, there is some indication of 
misspecification in model 3 that estimates the effect on TFP. Even though the AR(2) p-value does 
not reject the null of no autocorrelation, it is likely that some autocorrelation still exists when using 
time-series data. Hence, the instruments are likely weak in this model, which should be taken into 
consideration. Last, a note on the explanatory power of the models should be made. The 
computation of goodness-of-fit measures in panel data applications is fairly rare and is mostly 
appropriate when the model is estimated with OLS (Verbeek, 2011: 386). In addition, the R-squared 
takes into account the fixed effects, which to a large extent perfectly fit the variation (or at least 
capture it). Hence, R-squared values tend to be high and somewhat misleading (Verbeek, 2012: 387), 
which is confirmed in the short-term analysis. The explanation power ranges between 50-60 percent 
in the shorter run, for both estimators. Pattillo et al. (2004) gets similar results. However, the R-
sqaured should not be used to evaluate the model rather than cautiously facilitate the choice of 
specifications (Verbeek, 2012: 387).   
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Table A7 provides the long-term results for the control variables and the results for the specification 
tests. The set-up is the same as that for Table A6 in Appendix 6.  For the long-term analysis, some 
controls show larger standard errors and are of the unexpected sign. In addition, there seems to be 
fewer significant results for the controls on the longer term compared to the short-term analysis. 
This is similar to the results found for the debt variables in section 5.2.2. The main explanation to 
this problem may lie in the choice of time-periods on the longer run. This thesis includes five-year 
average growth rates, but the effect may run through longer periods. In addition, the same controls 
are used in all four models. In an ideal world with limited time, the control variables should perhaps 
be further customized for all four models. However, the precision increased as debt variables were 
added to the regression40.  
 
Table A7. Long-term regression results for control variables41.  
 
Dependent variable GDP growth Capital stock growth TFP growth HH Cons growth 
 
SGMM1/ BOLS2/ SGMM BOLS SGMM BOLS SGMM BOLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged dependent variable, 
one period 
0.33* 
(0.17) 
0.38*** 
(0.13) 
0.42** 
(0.19) 
0.64*** 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.19) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.08 
(0.29) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
Population 
3.52** 
(1.77) 
1.61 
(1.52) 
-1.85** 
(0.88) 
0.03 
(0.54) 
-12.20 
(10.02) 
13.21 
(11.83) 
-0.69 
(1.37) 
-0.34 
(0.36) 
Trade 
0.08 
(0.16) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.96* 
(0.56) 
-0.95* 
(0.50) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Age dep 
1.14 
(1.31) 
-0.18 
(0.46) 
0.29 
(0.52) 
-0.13 
(0.16) 
3.01 
(5.49) 
7.21** 
(3.57) 
0.61 
(0.39) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
Inflation 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
1.47*** 
(0.39) 
0.25 
(0.24) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Savings 
0.93* 
(0.50) 
0.59** 
(0.24) 
-0.17 
(0.36) 
-0.14* 
(0.08) 
2.14 
(3.09) 
1.12 
(1.75) 
-0.73*** 
(0.19) 
-0.23*** 
(0.05) 
Crisis 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.23*** 
(0.06) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
Schooling 
1.24*** 
(0.44) 
-0.15 
(0.26) 
-0.24 
(0.17) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
-5.64** 
(2.18) 
-3.65* 
(2.05) 
-0.20* 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
Long interest rate 
-2.10* 
(1.20) 
-0.80* 
(0.43) 
-0.22 
(0.27) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
-15.45** 
(7.34) 
-4.03 
(3.43) 
0.67 
(0.44) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
Constant 
-0.01 
(0.01)  
0.01** 
(0.00) 
 
0.07 
(0.07) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
Observations 
Number of id 
Number of instruments 
Arrelano-Bond AR(2) test 
(p-value) (i) 
Hansen J-test (p-value) (ii) 
R-squared 
109 
20 
24 
0.26 
 
0.37 
0.41 
95 
20 
22 
0.91 
 
 
0.51 
109 
20 
24 
0.58 
 
0.42 
0.36 
95 
20 
22 
0.78 
 
 
0.52 
109 
20 
30 
0.17 
 
0.91 
0.40 
95 
20 
22 
0.04 
 
 
0.18 
109 
20 
24 
0.08 
 
0.97 
0.30 
95 
20 
22 
0.21 
 
 
0.41 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
1/ For SGMM estimations: all debt variables lagged one period 
                                                 
40 A conscious decision is made not to include complete tables of both debt variables and control variables 
since such table/tables would be too extensive for any comprehending use.  
41 Since number of observations decrease with average growth rates, the number of controls is reduced. 
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 2/ For BOLS estimations: all debt variables lagged one period; estimator chosen is the Blundell and Bond (BB) with no intercept; bias 
of order 1 included which forces an approximation up to O(1/T); number of bootstraps equal 1000. NOTE: The BOLS is estimated 
in two steps. In the first step, the initial estimates of the lagged dependent variable and the explanatory variables are obtained using the 
BB-estimator as described in section 4.2. The BB-estimator is a one-step SGMM and hence the number of instruments, the AR(2) p-
value, and the R-squared value relates to the first estimation. In the second step, the estimates obtained is used to calculate the bias 
approximations and thus receive the LSDVC estimates presented above. For more information, see Bruno (2005a) 
(i) The null hypothesis is that the first-differenced errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation.  
(ii) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous. For the BOLS estimator, no reporting on the Hansen J-test is 
made. The Hansen J-test is robust but is weakened by many instruments. For more information, see Roodman (2009). 
 
Analyzing the results for the specification-tests for the estimators, the Hansen J-test still provides 
high p-values, even though not as high as one. P-values range between 0.37-0.97 and hence cannot 
the validity of the instruments be assured in the long-term either. In addition, there is little indication 
of autocorrelation as it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation in the majority of the specifications. However, autocorrelation seems to be present in the 
third model once again. The explanation power ranges between 30-50 percent in the longer run, i.e. it 
is lower than in the short-term analysis, but still fairly high and in line with previous research 
(Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012). The lower explanation power compared to the short-term 
analysis is likely explained by the lower variance when using five-year average growth periods.    
